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ORIGINALISM AND THE SENSE–REFERENCE DISTINCTION 
CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN* 
ABSTRACT 
I deploy the sense–reference distinction and its kin from the philosophy of 
language to answer the question of what in constitutional interpretation 
should, and should not, be able to change after founders adopt a constitutional 
provision.  I suggest that a constitutional expression’s reference, but not its 
sense, can change.  Interpreters should thus give founders’ assessments of 
reference only Skidmore-level deference.  From this position, I criticize the 
theories of constitutional interpretation offered by Raoul Berger, Jed 
Rubenfeld, and Richard Fallon, and apply the theory to whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbids racial segregation in public schools. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Twice this past spring, disputes broke out among members of the Supreme 
Court about whether the Constitution changes.  In his dissents in Roper v. 
Simmons1 and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,2 Justice Scalia, joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, sets out a vision of an 
unchanging Constitution.  In both episodes, Justices Stevens, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, opposes the originalist trio’s efforts on behalf of a living, changing 
Constitution.  These disputes reveal the Justices’ failure to appreciate certain 
distinctions from the philosophy of language.  Were these distinctions more 
clearly understood, a neglected middle ground would emerge for those who 
desire both to obey the historic, unchanging meaning conveyed in 
constitutional language and to take proper account of facts that have changed 
since the founding, or which the founders may have misperceived.  The 
philosophy of language can thus uncover an attractive yet neglected position 
 
* Ph.D. candidate, philosophy, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1998, Yale Law School. 
  The author wishes to thank Bruce Ackerman, Larry Alexander, Paddy Blanchette, Jeff 
Goldsworthy, Bonnie Green, Ray Hain, Lynn Joy, Matt Kennedy, Andy Koppelman, Alasdair 
McIntyre, Luther Munford, Stephen Sachs, David Solomon, David Thunder, and participants in 
discussions at the University of Notre Dame and University of Texas at Austin. 
 1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 2. 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005). 
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and offer the prospect of closure to a debate that seems interminable.  Indeed, 
these distinctions are urgently needed in order to rescue the Court from 
continued confusion over the relevance of historical materials in cases like 
Roper and McCreary County, or indeed in any case involving basic 
interpretive controversy. 
In the juvenile death penalty case, Roper, Scalia ridicules the Court for 
suggesting that constitutional outcomes can properly change: “What a mockery 
today’s opinion makes of Hamilton’s expectation [that the judiciary would be 
‘bound down by strict rules and precedents’], announcing the Court’s 
conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 
years—not, mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but 
that the Constitution has changed.”3  Later, he says, “In a system based upon 
constitutional and statutory text democratically adopted, the concept of ‘law’ 
ordinarily signifies that particular words have a fixed meaning.  Such law does 
not change . . . .”4  A footnote disparages cases that have given “brave new 
meaning” to constitutional provisions.5  Scalia thereby suggests that any 
change in constitutional outcomes amounts to a change in the meaning of 
constitutional language.6 
In response, Justice Stevens’s concurrence, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
suggests that even the meaning of the Constitution can change.  He denies that 
“the meaning of [the Eighth] Amendment [was] frozen when it was originally 
drafted,”7 and claims that the Framers would agree that “our understanding of 
the Constitution does change from time to time.”8  However, Stevens does not 
 
 3. 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. at 629. 
 5. Id. at 627 n.9 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–73 (2003); United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 847–50 (1992)). 
 6. I should issue a caveat here about Justice Scalia’s views.  In his Roper and McCreary 
County dissents, Justice Scalia suggests that originalism forbids any change in constitutional 
outcomes.  But elsewhere, he claims that changing constitutional outcomes are not a problem for 
the originalist if a provision, like the Fourth Amendment, refers to a separate changing body of 
law.  See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1540 (2006) (“Justice STEVENS’ 
attempted critique of originalism confuses the original import of the Fourth Amendment with the 
background sources of law to which the Amendment, on its original meaning, referred. . . . 
[C]hanges in the law of property to which the Fourth Amendment referred would not alter the 
Amendment’s meaning . . . . There is nothing new or surprising in the proposition that our 
unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies of law that might themselves change.”).  I do not 
attempt here to give a comprehensive or systematic account of Scalia’s views, but simply set out 
his views as he states them in his Roper and McCreary County dissents.  To the extent that Justice 
Scalia allows for changing constitutional outcomes, his commitment in Roper to a fully 
unchanging constitutional law and his unqualified allegiance in McCreary County to the Framers’ 
views regarding constitutional outcomes would need to be tempered or further explained. 
 7. Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 8. Id. 
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give any indication of how we might know when one of those times might be 
here again, explaining only that “the pace of that evolution is a matter for 
continuing debate.”9  Indeed, Stevens not only leaves the pace of constitutional 
evolution unclear and unmotivated, but also its direction: he exhibits no 
principle to explain either where to go with the Constitution or how fast. 
In his dissent in the Kentucky Ten Commandments case, McCreary 
County v. ACLU of Kentucky, Justice Scalia, with the same allies, again 
suggests that in order to maintain a stable constitutional meaning, we must 
adhere to the Founders’ practices: 
  It is no answer for Justice STEVENS to say that the understanding that 
these official and quasi-official actions reflect was not “enshrined in the 
Constitution’s text.”  The Establishment Clause, upon which Justice 
STEVENS would rely, was enshrined in the Constitution’s text, and these 
official actions show what it meant. . . . What is more probative of the meaning 
of the Establishment Clause than the actions of the very Congress that 
proposed it, and of the first President charged with observing it?10 
The Founders’ actions, for Scalia, are the best possible evidence of the 
meaning of their language.  He considers the Framers’ actions alone, and thus 
neglects any possibility that an explanation from the Framers of why their 
actions were consistent with their language might shed better light on the text’s 
meaning. 
In response, Justice Stevens, joined again by Justice Ginsburg, again 
denies that the Constitution’s meaning is stable.  Responding to Scalia’s 
dissent in his own dissent in the Texas Ten Commandments case, Van Orden v. 
Perry,11 Stevens says, 
  It is our duty . . . to interpret the First Amendment’s command that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” not by 
merely asking what those words meant to observers at the time of the 
founding, but instead by deriving from the Clause’s text and history the broad 
principles that remain valid today.12 
Stevens then cites racial school segregation, sex discrimination, and his 
concurrence in Roper as cases in which the Court properly departed from the 
original history of the Constitution.13  He then says, “We serve our 
constitutional mandate by expounding the meaning of constitutional provisions 
 
 9. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587. 
 10. 125 S. Ct. at 2754–55 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 11. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
 12. Id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Roper, 534 U.S. at 551–607 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., 
concurring)). 
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with one eye towards our Nation’s history and the other fixed on its democratic 
aspirations.”14  However, as in Roper, Stevens sets out no criterion for when 
the original history should be defeated by “democratic aspirations.” 
Justices Scalia and Stevens construct arguments with a critical implicit 
common premise.  In effect, Scalia reasons this way: 
(1) Constitutional outcomes properly change only if constitutional 
meaning properly changes; 
(2) Constitutional meaning cannot properly change; therefore 
(3) Constitutional outcomes cannot properly change. 
Preferring modus ponens to Scalia’s modus tollens, Stevens agrees with (1), 
but instead implicitly reasons 
(1) Constitutional outcomes properly change only if constitutional 
meaning properly changes; but 
(~3) Constitutional outcomes can properly change; therefore 
(~2) Constitutional meaning can properly change. 
However, the shared premise (1) is false.  Distinguishing sense from reference 
reveals that changing constitutional outcomes can coexist with stability in 
constitutional meaning.  Correcting this mistake, embraced by a majority of the 
Court in Roper, McCreary, and Van Orden, lies at the beginning of sound 
thinking about how to interpret the Constitution. 
While five of the Justices took sides in the Scalia/Stevens fray, the other 
four—O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer—did not.15  Neither, however, 
did they offer any competing middle ground.  I want to offer such middle 
ground here.  This is ground sadly neglected in the long-running debate of 
which Stevens’s and Scalia’s disputes this spring were a part.  Jonah Goldberg 
summarized the public debate last year: “A ‘living’ Constitution grows and 
changes with the times.  Generally speaking, liberals want a living Constitution 
and conservatives don’t . . . . [O]f course, I want a dead Constitution.”16  In 
 
 14. Id. at 2889. 
 15. In Roper, however, Justice O’Connor did seem to cite Stevens’s concurrence favorably.  
Roper, 543 U.S. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer sets out his views on 
interpretation in his just-released 2005 book Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic 
Constitution, which includes an extensive discussion and criticism of originalism, or “literalism,” 
as he puts it, but he does not mention the Scalia/Stevens disputes in Roper and McCreary/Van 
Orden directly. 
 16. Jonah Goldberg, It’s Alive! Why the Constitution Should Remain Dead, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE, July 8, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg070803.asp.  For more 
typical statements on whether the Constitution changes, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 21–22 (2d ed. 1997) 
(“[A]ntiactivists (originalists) maintain that judges are not authorized to revise the Constitution 
and that it is to be construed in light of the Founders’ explanations of what they meant to 
accomplish, no more, no less.” (footnote omitted)); Raoul Berger, Some Reflections On 
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contrast both to Goldberg and his opponents, I think that we have a partially 
living and partially dead Constitution. 
In this Article I explain how distinctions of long standing in the philosophy 
of language can present a compelling distinction between which of the 
Constitution’s attributes change and which do not.  Judges and lawyers who 
ignore the progress that philosophers have made in understanding how 
language works will only find themselves repeating old mistakes and 
maintaining old confusions.  The Justices’ failures to appreciate the difference 
between the meaning historically expressed by constitutional language, on the 
one hand, and the tangible outcomes accomplished by that language, on the 
other, lead to a frustrating dynamic.  Justices Stevens and Ginsburg and their 
allies insist rightly that the Constitution must take account of our changing 
world, but they have no generally agreed-upon theory for why or when these 
changing facts should matter for constitutional outcomes.  On the other hand, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist and their allies insist 
rightly that to accomplish its job the Constitution must remain stable, but they 
frequently remain blind to the possibility that outdated facts, or factual 
mistakes, may have underlain the Founders’ conclusions about constitutional 
outcomes.  The theory I present will make clear how we can get the best of 
both views.  We can make a precise accounting of the relevance of factual 
change to change in constitutional outcomes, while still preserving a stable 
anchor of constitutional meaning which, combined with the facts, produces 
those outcomes.  My view thus meets both a theoretical need—resolving this 
long-standing dispute over the extent to which the Constitution is alive and 
changing—and a practical need to determine exactly what sorts of historical 
 
Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) [hereinafter Berger, Reflections] 
(“[Interpretivism] conceives the judicial role as interpreting, not revising, the Constitution.”); 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40 (Amy 
Guttman ed., 1997) (“It certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally suggests 
changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in 
such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.”); Stephen Reinhardt & 
Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Feb. 2, 2004, http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2004_02_ 
01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html (Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit recently 
describing himself as one of those “judges who treat[s] the Constitution as a living, breathing 
instrument”); Goldberg, supra (quoting Al Gore: “I would look for justices of the Supreme Court 
who understand that our Constitution is a living and breathing document, that it was intended by 
our Founders to be interpreted in the light of the constantly evolving experience of the American 
people.”); Joseph Sobran, Does the Constitution “Grow”?, SOBRAN’S, Oct. 5, 2000, 
http://www.sobran.com/columns/1999-2001/001005.shtml (“The Constitution didn’t ‘grow’; it 
was never supposed to.  Written law must be stable, or it isn’t law.  A government that can 
change the very meaning of old words is tyrannical.”); Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and 
Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 285 (1995) (“Those who argue 
on behalf of originalism are not inclined to intone the virtues of . . . adaptability [or] 
flexibility . . . .”). 
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evidence should constrain courts deciding cases like Roper, McCreary County, 
or Van Orden. 
The simple question whether or not the Constitution changes—whether it 
is living or dead—is not well posed without refinement.  No reasonable 
theorist will contend either (a) that everything about the Constitution—
everything relevant for constitutional law—is fixed at the time of the framing, 
or (b) that none of the Constitution’s legally relevant attributes are fixed at the 
framing.  If we define originalism in a strong way, as requiring that nothing 
about the Constitution change, no one will be an originalist.  But if we define it 
weakly, as saying merely that some things about the Constitution stay the 
same, everyone will be an originalist. 
Instead of mooting such a coarse-grained question as whether everything 
or nothing changes about the Constitution, and arguing about which represents 
the real definition of originalism, those interested in originalism should ask 
what particular aspects of the Constitution legitimately change and which do 
not.  Answers to these questions will be important, whether they amount to an 
affirmation of originalism, or a departure from it.  I will here defend an answer 
based on Frege’s sense–reference distinction:17 the sense of a constitutional 
expression is fixed at the time of the framing, but the reference is not, because 
it depends on the facts about the world, which can change.  At the risk of 
indulging in a pun that may grow tiresome, I call my theory the Theory of 
Original Sinn, after Frege’s word for sense, Sinn. 
Were the Theory of Original Sinn accepted, Justices Stevens and Scalia 
would not be debating the broad question whether the meaning of the 
Constitution can ever change, but instead whether or not the framers were right 
about the specific reference-yielding facts.  While the meaning and sense of the 
constitutional language are, as Justice Scalia insists, fixed, the reference of that 
language depends on particular facts that the framers might have 
misunderstood or that may have changed.  Unfortunately, none of the Justices 
addressed this precise question in Roper, McCreary County, or Van Orden. 
While the framers are fallible regarding the reference of their constitutional 
language, they are still extremely useful guides.  As I explain later, under the 
Theory of Original Sinn, framers’ assessments of reference would receive the 
deference described in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.  The framers’ assessments of 
reference, 
while not controlling upon [later interpreters of the Constitution] by reason of 
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which [later interpreters] may properly resort for guidance.  The weight of 
such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident 
 
 17. See Gottlob Frege, Über Sinn und Bedeutung, 100 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND 
PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK 25 (1892), translated in 57 PHIL. REV. 209 (1948) [hereinafter Frege, 
Sense and Reference]. 
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in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.18 
The quality of the Framers’ rationales for thinking that the Establishment 
Clause allows non-coercive governmental endorsements of monotheism, or for 
thinking that the Eighth Amendment allows the death penalty for 17 year olds, 
is critical.  If errors or obsolete facts were involved, their conclusions on these 
issues alone are not interpretively controlling.  The Theory of Original Sinn 
therefore points to a more searching examination of the Framers’ thinking than 
other forms of originalism would require. 
Besides sense and reference, I will deploy two kindred distinctions to 
present my theory: John Stuart Mill’s distinction between connotation and 
denotation19 and Rudolph Carnap’s distinction between intensions and 
extensions.20  These distinctions, particularly the distinction between intension 
and extension, may differ slightly from the sense–reference distinction, but 
only in matters of detail not immediately relevant for my use of the distinctions 
for constitutional theory.  The Theory of Original Sinn could equivalently be 
explained as holding to a fixed constitutional connotation, but evolving 
constitutional denotation, or as holding to a fixed constitutional intension, but 
evolving constitutional extension. 
While a full defense of the use of these distinctions to analyze the 
Constitution would involve a full defense of the philosophical viability of the 
distinctions, I will here simply rely on the prestige of the distinctions and the 
fact that philosophers of widely differing views have found them helpful and 
important.  Law and philosophy are both in the distinction business, and law 
would benefit from attention to distinctions that have survived considerable 
philosophical scrutiny.  While that scrutiny has, to be sure, not persuaded all 
philosophers of the viability of the distinction between sense and reference, I 
leave the task of persuading holdouts to other occasions and other 
 
 18. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  For more on Skidmore, see infra 
notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 19. 1 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 34–41 (8th ed. 1872) (Book I, chapter ii, 
section 5). 
 20. RUDOLF CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY § 40, at 177–78 (1947).  Unlike Mill and 
Frege, Carnap did not invent his terminological distinction.  Also, Meaning and Necessity does 
not clearly explain intensions, as I will below, as functions from possible worlds to extensions.  
Richard Montague credits Carnap’s unpublished work as providing the germ of this idea.  
Richard Montague, On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities, 53 THE MONIST 159, 164 
(1969).  The basic terminology appears in Rudolf Carnap, Replies and Systematic Expositions, in 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLPH CARNAP 859–1013 (Paul Arthur Schilpp ed., 1963).  See id. at 
891 (referring to “possible states of the universe of discourse” with models, rather than linguistic 
entities, as in earlier work). 
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philosophers.  I come not to praise the sense–reference distinction but simply 
to use it, presupposing its praiseworthiness. 
I will take as my interlocutors three constitutional theorists.  The late Raoul 
Berger,21 who condemned the modern Supreme Court for departing from the 
specific expectations of the Framers, probably comes closest among modern 
theorists to contending that everything should stay the same about the 
Constitution as it bears on constitutional law.  Despite this appearance, I will 
argue that, if he is to make sense of simple Framer ignorance, Berger’s theory 
cannot really hold all of constitutional culture fixed. 
Two other thinkers who promote, as I do, a partially changing, partially 
immutable interpretation of the Constitution are Jed Rubenfeld22 and Richard 
Fallon.23  Rubenfeld thinks constitutional interpretation should take as its 
anchor the original tangible paradigm cases, while original understandings of 
the general categories encompassing these cases can be neglected.  Richard 
Fallon thinks that constitutional interpretation should be guided by a 
recognition of five different modes of constitutional argument—text, original 
history, precedent, structure, and policy.  Fallon thinks all of these modes are 
legitimate and should be brought into coherence if possible, but with a ranking 
of modes in case of disagreement.  I will argue that the Theory of Original 
Sinn offers a more economical and more compelling theory, particularly when 
we consider the possibility of factual errors by the Framers. 
Finally, I will give a sketch of how the Theory of Original Sinn might be 
deployed to assess whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racially 
segregated public schools, interacting both with Berger’s, Rubenfeld’s, and 
Fallon’s arguments on the question and with Michael McConnell’s revisionary 
account.24 
 
 21. See Berger, Reflections, supra note 16. 
 22. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119 
(1995) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Reading]; Jed Rubenfeld, On Fidelity in Constitutional Law, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1469 (1997) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Fidelity]; Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment 
and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085 (1998) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Moment]; JED 
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001) 
[hereinafter RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME]; JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: 
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005) [hereinafter RUBENFELD, 
REVOLUTION]. 
 23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).  Fallon builds on the similar theory set out in 
PHILIP BABBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). 
 24. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947 (1995). 
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II.  SENSE, REFERENCE, AND THE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SINN 
First I will briefly explain Frege’s distinction between sense and reference 
and its kin.  A word’s Fregean referent is the tangible actual thing in the world 
that the word picks out, while the Fregean sense expressed in a word gives the 
word’s cognitive value and the mode of presentation of the referent.  Because 
the sense of a word is what is strictly conveyed and expressed by the language 
alone, sense is a natural touchstone for those who take constitutional language 
as paramount.  Frege introduces sense as the manner in which language 
presents an object—the object’s mode of presentation: 
  It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, 
combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may 
be called the referent of the sign, also what I would like to call the sense of the 
sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained.25 
To use an expression to pick out a particular object we must first grasp the 
property conveyed in the word’s sense, and only then see what object has that 
particular property.  Frege says, “A proper name (word, sign, sign 
combination, expression) expresses its sense, refers to or designates its 
referent.  By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its referent.”26  
While Frege does not give any algorithm for discovering or grasping sense, the 
existence of functioning languages shows that it is possible: “The sense of a 
proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the 
language or totality of designations to which it belongs.”27 
Frege’s basic insight is that we can pick out an object by means of 
different unique properties.  The same thing may have multiple informationally 
distinct descriptions.  A fork on the northeast corner of a table may be referred 
to as either “the easternmost fork on this table” or “the northernmost fork on 
this table.”  Each description picks out the same fork.  But the descriptions do 
not mean the same thing.  To the question, “Is the northernmost fork the same 
as the easternmost fork?”  Frege offers terminology for a nuanced response: 
the referents of “the northernmost fork” and “the easternmost fork” are the 
same, but their senses are different, because north does not mean east.  Imagine 
that we have one fork in the northeast quadrant of a table with empty northwest 
and southeast quadrants.  The rules “remove all forks on the northern half of 
the table” and “remove all forks on the eastern half of the table” will be two 
different ways to accomplish the command to remove the same fork.  But the 
rules are obviously different.  Even though the reference of “all forks on the 
northern half of the table” is the same as the reference of “all forks on the 
eastern half of the table,” the senses of these two expressions are different. 
 
 25. Frege, Sense and Reference, supra note 17, at 210. 
 26. Id. at 214. 
 27. Id. at 210. 
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Frege’s distinction has been enormously influential in the past century of 
philosophy of language.28  Much of this influence is transmitted through one of 
Frege’s last students, Rudolph Carnap, whose distinction between intension 
and extension is closely related to the distinction between sense and reference 
and represents one of its most important refinements.29  Carnap’s extensions 
are Fregean referents: actual tangible objects in the world.  As standardly 
glossed, Carnap’s intensions are functions from possible worlds to extensions, 
and are determined by an expression’s sense.30  This formulation makes 
particularly clear that the facts about the world stand in the gap between 
intension and extension.  The same is true of the gap between sense and 
reference.  To learn the referent of a word, we must first know its sense.  The 
sense of an expression will determine a function from how the world is to the 
referent; we then plug in the way the world is and finally have our referent.  In 
our fork example, the phrase “all forks on the eastern half of the table” will 
express a sense that determines a function from the set of different ways the 
table could be arranged to the set of particular forks on the table’s eastern half.  
To know what “eastern half of the table” means, I must be able, given an 
arrangement of the table, to say whether an object is on the eastern half.  To 
apply our command to remove the eastern-half forks, we must (a) know this 
function, i.e., know what “fork on the eastern half of the table” means, and (b) 
know what to plug into the function, i.e., know the arrangement of the table.  
In giving the Framers only the authority to determine sense, and hence 
intension, of their language, but not the authority to determine that language’s 
reference or extension, the Theory of Original Sinn thus divides authority 
between the Framers and later interpreters: the Framers are in charge of setting 
the sense; later interpreters are in charge of assessing the reference-yielding 
facts. 
Intensions are closely related to senses, but are not quite the same.  Senses 
are more finely grained, and intensions less so.  Intensions supervene on 
senses: that is, two expressions could not have the same sense, but express 
 
 28. See, e.g., infra note 66. 
 29. See Jerrold J. Katz, The Problem in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, 95 J. PHIL. 547, 553 
(1998) (“Frege defined sense as the determiner of reference, and the subsequent Carnapian 
doctrine on which sense is a function from possible worlds to extensions is only a slight 
modification that brings Frege’s definition in line with the modal expansion of the universe.”). 
 30. See, e.g., David J. Chalmers, On Sense and Intension, 16 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 135, 145 
(2002) [hereinafter Chalmers, Sense and Intension] (“[A]n expression’s sense might be seen as an 
intension: a function from possibilities to extensions.  This function takes a given possibility, and 
associates it with an extension relative to that possibility.”); William G. Lycan, What is the 
“Subjectivity” of the Mental?, 4 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 109, 113 (1990) (“Each concept or Fregean 
intension can be represented in the standard way as a function from possible worlds to 
extensions.”); Katz, supra note 29; see also MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 31 (2d ed. 1962) (“Why a term is applied to a set of objects is indicated 
by its intension; the set of objects to which it is applicable constitutes its extension.”). 
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different functions from possible worlds to referents; sense determines 
intension.31  If two words point to something different in some possible world, 
then they cannot have the same informational content.  My theory that 
provisions of the Constitution have unchanging senses therefore requires that 
the provisions of the Constitution have unchanging intensions.  But two words 
or expressions could have the same intensions but different senses; intension 
does not fully determine sense.  For instance, “five minus two” has the same 
referent as “seven minus four” in every possible world, and thus the same 
intension, because numbers do not vary among different possible worlds.  But 
the expressions have different senses; they have different cognitive values.  
Likewise, it is also plausible that two proper names might express the same 
intension, because there is, for instance, no possible world in which Clark Kent 
is not identical to Superman, but these two names represent different modes of 
presentation of the one man.32 
Notwithstanding this distinction between sense and intension, the gap 
between intension and extension will be enough for my purposes.  I want to 
assess what about the Constitution should change when the state of the world 
changes.  Different ways in which a series of words can express the same 
function from possible worlds to referents—that is, cases where expressions 
have the same intension but different sense—will therefore not be my 
immediate concern.  The stronger view that provisions of the Constitution have 
unchanging senses entails the weaker view that provisions of the Constitution 
have unchanging intensions.  The weaker view, however, will be enough for 
me to distinguish and criticize other theories. 
Frege’s predecessors also drew very similar distinctions. The most 
important in English-language philosophy was John Stuart Mill, who 
introduced “connotation” and “denotation” in his A System of Logic: 
“[W]henever the names given to objects convey any information, that is, 
whenever they properly have any meaning, the meaning resides not in what 
they denote, but in what they connote.”33  Just as Fregean sense is the cognitive 
value carried by a term, Millian connotation is the information a term conveys.  
“[B]y learning what things it is a name of, we do not learn the meaning of the 
name: for to the same thing we may, with equal propriety, apply many names, 
not equivalent in meaning.”34  Millian connotation is the “information[al]” 
content of an expression, which seems equivalent, at least for present purposes, 
to Fregean sense.  The Millian denotation of an expression is, like reference 
and extension, the “things it is a name of.” 
 
 31. See COHEN & NAGEL, supra note 30, at 30–31. 
 32. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (2d ed. 1980). 
 33. 1 MILL, supra note 19, at 36. 
 34. Id. at 40. 
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I cannot here give a full defense of the Theory of Original Sinn,35 but let 
me give a brief initial motivation for the theory.  We might be tempted to think 
that it is only the referents of constitutional expressions—the particular, actual 
tangible constitutional consequences with which we must deal—that matter.  
We are practical people, concerned first and foremost with tangible 
constitutional consequences, and life is short.  If the sense is not reducible to 
actual, tangible constitutional consequences, why should we care about it as a 
constitutional matter?  The core intuition is this: sense matters because it 
matters what the Constitution says about the actual, tangible constitutional 
consequences.  Constitutional sense is critical (a) because it matters what 
information the constitutional text conveys about the constitutional 
consequences, (b) because it matters under what mode of presentation the 
Constitution gives us its consequences, and (c) because it matters what 
implications the Constitution would have for a range of possible worlds 
including, but not limited to, the actual one. 
Indeed, it seems very plausible to me to say more.  Our concern for the 
constitutional referent, as those who live under the authority of the 
Constitution, seems derivative from our concern for constitutional sense.  Not 
only is it not the case that we care only about particular actual constitutional 
consequences to the exclusion of concern for constitutionally borne 
information, constitutional mode of presentation, and constitutional 
implications across multiple possible worlds, but our concern for particular, 
tangible constitutional consequences derives from our concern for such 
constitutional information and mode of presentation.  We care about the 
constitutional referent because the Constitution, by expressing its sense, 
conveys information about it and thereby points us to it, forbidding or 
commanding it. 
If we care about the reference, extension, and denotation of constitutional 
language only because we care about that language’s sense, intension, and 
connotation, then the Theory of Original Sinn is the natural position to take.  
The sense of constitutional language is a sensible constitutional touchstone and 
 
 35. In a work in progress, I consider one way to use the Constitution’s self-referring clauses 
(the clauses which use “this Constitution” or “here” or “now”) to construct an argument that, if 
we agree with the Constitution’s view of itself, we should think of it as a historically embodied 
textual assertion of authority, and that such a constitutional ontology would point toward some 
form of originalist textualism as the proper theory of constitutional law (if we agree with that 
assertion of authority).  For a similar argument, produced independently of my own views, see 
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–31 (2003).  “The document itself . . . appears to 
prescribe textualism (in some form or another) as the proper mode of interpretation and 
application of the Constitution by those holding office under it.”  Id. at 1128 (arguing from the 
Supremacy Clause).  But here, I am mainly concerned to give an explanation of my view and 
distinguish it from other prominent theories in a way that can highlight some problems with those 
rivals. 
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compelling candidate for what we should hold fixed when time passes and the 
world changes.  Whatever we hold fixed constitutionally as the world changes 
should be the sort of thing that can take into account differences in possible 
worlds, and not be subject to them: a function from possible worlds to 
outcomes fits the bill.  Likewise, what we keep fixed in the Constitution 
should, in advance of knowing the facts about how the world may change, give 
us information about our constitutional outcomes and tell us in what guise or 
mode of presentation we should look for them.  Connotation and sense 
accomplish this task.36 
 
 36. At this point I should acknowledge my debt, not just to the United States Supreme Court 
and High Court of Australia, whose statements suggesting the Theory of Original Sinn I will 
exposit below, but to many other contemporary thinkers about the Constitution who have hinted 
at a similar position.  None of them, however, has rested a full-blown theory of constitutional 
change on the sense–reference distinction.  Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of 
Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 582 (1998), defend at length “a distinction between two 
uses of the term ‘meaning’ to diagnose the flaw in a seemingly natural line of argument leading to 
the proposition that constitutional interpretation must respect original practices.”  At one point, 
they cite Frege, without much extensive deployment of the philosophy of language.  Id. at 588–89 
n.84.  Michael W. McConnell criticizes Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and “those 
who interpret the Constitution as if it froze into place the conclusions reached at the time of the 
framing about the application of constitutional principles to concrete situations.”  Michael W. 
McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361–62 (1987).  Robert 
Bork briefly suggests such a view in the midst of an excess of bomb-throwing rhetoric.  He 
defends Brown on the ground of factual change and/or Framer error, suggesting that what is really 
fixed at the time of the framing is, as the Theory of Original Sinn would have it, a fact-
unsaturated major premise, i.e., a function from possible worlds to outcomes.  See ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 162–63 (1990) 
(“[A]ll that a judge committed to original understanding requires is that the text, structure, and 
history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a major premise.  That 
major premise is the principle or stated value that the ratifiers wanted to protect against hostile 
legislation or executive action.  The judge must then see whether that principle or value is 
threatened by the statute or action challenged in the case before him.  The answer to that question 
provides his minor premise, and the conclusion follows.”); id. at 82 (allowing for Framer error: 
“[E]quality and segregation were mutually inconsistent, though the framers did not understand 
that.”); see also Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 751, 758 (1986) (“[I]t is the very essence of general terms that they are capable of 
governing particular cases not envisaged by their authors.  General terms are not mere compendia 
of the specific instances imagined by those individuals who first enunciated them.  What the 
miracle of language requires is that words, ideas, and concepts reach new instances.”) (footnote 
omitted); Patrick J. Kelley, An Alternative Originalist Opinion for Brown v. Board of Education, 
20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 76 (1995) (“[T]he intended general meaning of statutory language is not 
reducible to the set of specifically intended applications of that statutory language. . . . 
[L]egislative intent is best understood as the intent to adopt directive language with a particular 
general meaning and to bring about the consequences flowing from the consistent application of 
that general meaning in particular circumstances.  Thus, although the intended general meaning is 
fixed by legislative action and does not thereafter change, the set of factual applications of that 
fixed general meaning may expand or contract with the application of the fixed general meaning 
to changed circumstances.  New situations, unheard of at the time the statute was enacted, may 
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fall squarely within the fixed intended meaning.”); Gerard V. Bradley, The Bill of Rights and 
Originalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 417, 420 (“The Constitution is not a collage of photographs of 
early national America, much less of ancient Palestine.  The Constitution is comprised of 
principles whose practical import changes with time—as America changes—even as the 
principles remain the same.”); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 
25 FED. L. REV. 1, 31 (1997) (expositing the theory adopted by the Australian High Court: “The 
distinction between connotation and denotation derives from the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, 
and is similar to if not equivalent to the modern distinctions between sense and reference, and 
intension and extension. . . . [T]he world which the word refers to; its connotation, sense or 
intension consists of the criteria which define it, and thereby determine its denotation.”).  But see 
id. at 32 (“But in many cases the connotation/denotation distinction can be very difficult, and 
perhaps in some cases impossible, to apply.”).  For a parallel suggestion regarding statutes, see 
M.B.W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1329, 1358–63 
(1996) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994), and 
suggesting that an emphasis on intension over extension in statutory interpretation can resolve 
several objections to legislative intent). 
  Without presenting a general theory of interpretation, Hugo Adam Bedau deploys Frege 
on sense and reference against Professor Berger: 
[N]o general term, in or out of the Constitution, in 1789 or today, ever means the things to 
which it refers.  For a century at least, philosophers have been explaining this lesson to all 
who will listen and think.  [Bedau here cites Frege.]  A fortiori, the constitutional phrase 
“cruel and unusual punishments” does not mean those particular punishments (whatever 
they all were) to which it was initially used to refer—or, for that matter, those to which 
you or I might use it to refer today.  What the term does mean, to be sure, is related to 
certain (authentic or putative) properties of the class of things to which it refers. What are 
those properties?  More precisely, what were they in 1789?  Until we know this clearly 
and indisputably, we cannot claim to know what the term means . . . . [I]n keeping with 
the fact that “cruel and unusual punishments” is a general term, not a proper name or an 
abbreviation for a handful of definite descriptions of specific punishments, neither Berger 
nor anyone else can cash it in favor of an exhaustive list of all and only those punishments 
that in 1789 were judged by the Framers to meet this description. The “Framers and 
Ratifiers” chose to formulate their prohibition in general and (pace [member of the First 
Congress William L.] Smith) “indefinite” terms, and they must be presumed to have 
intended the semantic consequences of this act. 
Hugo Adam Bedau, Berger’s Defense of the Death Penalty: How Not to Read the Constitution, 
81 MICH. L. REV. 1152, 1161–62 (1982) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982)).  In reply, Berger agreed that for him, “The 
Founders clearly tied ‘meaning’ to ‘reference.’”  Raoul Berger, Death Penalties and Hugo Bedau: 
A Crusading Philosopher Goes Overboard, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 873 (1984).  For a discussion, 
see infra text accompanying notes 68–72. 
  My view is briefly suggested and rejected, in a Millian rather than Fregean guise, by 
Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (1977) (“While it is true that the meaning of a term (‘connotation’) 
can remain constant even though the objects to which it applies (‘denotation’) may change, [here 
Munzer and Nickel footnote to Mill’s A System of Logic] this simple distinction is not helpful 
when new items included under a term are significantly dissimilar from those previously 
recognized.”). 
  It is also worth mentioning that E.D. Hirsch, Jr., who holds that an interpreted text has a 
fixed “meaning” but changing “significance,” uses Frege on sense and reference as the basis for 
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Let me deal here with two objections to using Frege or other philosophers 
of language in this way: vagueness, and the doctrine that sense determines 
reference. 
The first objection is that Frege did not intend his analysis to apply to 
actual, functioning languages, but only to an ideal language; he did not aim to 
describe how words actually functioned, but only how they might function, if 
we were to eliminate a number of infelicities that infect languages like German 
and English.  The chief idealization that Frege made was in assuming that 
conceptual boundaries are sharp, with no vagueness.37  But actual language is 
vague. 
I cannot give a full account here of the role of vagueness in the law.  
Vagueness itself has an enormous philosophical literature, and philosophers 
have not themselves reached any sort of consensus on what they have learned 
about it.38  There is thus surely no prefabricated “what philosophy has learned 
about vagueness” that we can simply import into constitutional interpretation. 
 
his distinction.  See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 242 (1967).  The fact that 
Hirsch relies on sense and reference for his theory of interpretation suggests strongly that the 
Theory of Original Sinn should be compatible with a view that, as Hirsch’s does, makes the 
author’s intention primary.  I do not have the time or space here to make clear how to reconcile 
my view with such intentionalism, but I believe that it can be done; the main point in such a 
reconciliation would be the thought that we have good reason to think that an author intends the 
textually expressed sense, rather than his understood reference, to bind interpreters.  For a 
different approach, in which the author’s intent might side with reference or with sense on 
different occasions, see Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All?  The Intentions of Authorities and 
the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 
369 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) [hereinafter Alexander, All or Nothing at All?] (“What we want 
to know—given some fact situation, the authorities’ semantic understandings, the true nature of 
that to which their terms refer, and so on—is what they determined should be the legal effect of 
their action.  Because the authorities’ exemplars may be inconsistent . . . with the true nature of 
the terms’ referents, the question is which did they intend to dominate in cases of such 
inconsistency.  In some cases, perhaps, referents will dominate definitions and exemplars.  In 
other cases, definitions or exemplars will dominate.”) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 361 n.11 
(relying on a later article by Hirsch, Counterfactuals in Interpretation, in INTERPRETING LAW 
AND LITERATURE (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988)); LARRY ALEXANDER & 
EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 106 
(2001) [hereinafter ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES] (repeating the passage just 
quoted from All or Nothing at All?); id. at 243 n.9 (again relying on Hirsch). 
 37. See, e.g., Gary Kemp, Frege’s Sharpness Requirement, 46 PHIL. Q. 168, 168 (1996) 
(“[Frege] also stressed that there can be no such thing as a concept which is not, as he put it, 
sharp: for every concept and object whatsoever, either the object falls under the concept, or it 
falls under its contradictory.  Thus only sentences whose predicates are defined for every object 
whatsoever as argument can be true.  And that seems manifestly wrong.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Alphabetical Bibliography on Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox, 
http://www.btinternet.com/~justin.needle/bib_alpha.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005) (listing 
several hundred philosophical discussions of vagueness).  For one systematic application of 
vagueness to the law, see generally TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000). 
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However, a sketch of my theory of vagueness and how it might apply to 
the law should be helpful.  We should distinguish three different phenomena 
related to whether an instance falls under a concept: (a) ignorance about where 
the boundaries of a concept lie; (b) intermediacy in the application of a 
concept, so that it applies only somewhat, neither applying to the instance 
completely nor not applying to the instance at all; and (c) indeterminacy about 
whether a concept applies to an instance, so that there is no right answer to 
whether the concept applies.  My view of vagueness, as a general matter, is 
this: we can explain away the appearance of indeterminacy as a mixture of 
ignorance and intermediacy.  Expressions might only partially apply to some 
instances, and we might not know whether expressions apply to particular 
instances, but there are no predicates for which there is no answer about 
whether, and to what extent, they apply. 
Consider an instance of vagueness: how many hairs does Harry need to 
lose to be bald?  Suppose that if he had 100,000 hairs on his head, he would 
clearly not be bald, and if he had none, he would clearly be bald.  Imagine 
plucking out Harry’s hair one by one: a sequence of cases from 100,000 hairs 
down to 0.  Where is the dividing line where baldness begins?  I would say that 
at some point, it is right to say that Harry begins to be a little bit bald.  He goes 
from being not bald at all to being bald to approximately degree 1/n, where n is 
the number of hairs in the transition stage.  We do not know exactly which 
hair’s removal would make the difference—this is where ignorance fits into 
my story—but this ignorance is not a problem, because the hair only marks the 
difference between being bald to degree 0 and being bald to degree 1/n for 
fairly large n. 
To apply my theory of vagueness to the law, we would need to decide what 
to do with the two phenomena to which I would reduce it: intermediacy and 
ignorance. 
The law could recognize intermediacy, or partial constitutionality, in 
different ways.  It is not clear what courts should do in cases where it seems 
that an action is only somewhat constitutional—neither fully allowed nor fully 
forbidden.  One way to perform such baby-splitting is through the use of 
partial liability rules, rather than property rules.39  In a case of partial 
constitutionality, an actor could be made to pay some cost for its actions, but 
not as much as in a case of fully unconstitutional behavior.  Alternatively, the 
law might continue to draw sharp boundaries around its concepts, but 
recognize that the rules it implements do not precisely replicate the 
constitutional categories: they implement the Constitution, rather than simply 
 
 39. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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enforcing it.40  There may be important elements, for this reason and for many 
others, for which constitutional law must go beyond constitutional 
interpretation; my concern here is chiefly with interpretation. 
The second phenomenon to which I would reduce vagueness, besides 
intermediacy, is ignorance.  Ignorance of the law is, of course, a common 
phenomenon.  Ignorance is why we have to have lawyers and academics, and 
why constitutional interpretation is hard work.  We should not be surprised that 
we are constitutionally ignorant; indeed, there would be no need for a theory of 
constitutional interpretation if we could always easily know the answers to 
interpretive questions.  The historical work necessary to discern what sense 
was expressed by an expression can be substantial—it can be as hard as 
learning a foreign language.  Further, it can also be hard to find out the 
reference-yielding facts.  The Theory of Original Sinn leaves ample room for 
constitutional ignorance, but this fact renders the theory plausible, not 
useless.41 
A second objection to the use of Frege in this way is his doctrine that 
“sense determines reference”—not that sense determines reference in 
conjunction with the facts, but that it determines reference full-stop, all on its 
own.  This complaint is related to Frege’s much-discussed troubles regarding 
indexicals such as “here,” “now,” and “I.”42  Frege claimed that the word “I” 
has a different sense when I use it than when you do.43  We can see why this 
makes some sense.  The word “I” surely expresses a different function from 
possible worlds to individuals when different people use it.  Sense, for Frege, 
does not attach to expressions as such, but to expressions used in a context.  
But at certain points, Frege does seem to use Sinn to refer to the qualities of an 
 
 40. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) 
[hereinafter FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword].  I 
respond below to Fallon’s claims about originalism and Brown v. Board of Education.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 252–59. 
 41. Ignorance chiefly points to the need for hard work, but it would also be good to have an 
account of constitutional presumptions that would tell us what to do when constitutional 
ignorance seems ineliminable.  For one such account, see Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its 
Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411 (1996). 
 42. See John Perry, Frege on Demonstratives, 86 PHIL. REV. 474, 488–91 (1977); David 
Kaplan, Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of 
Demonstratives and Other Indexicals, in THEMES FROM KAPLAN 481 (Joseph Almog et al. eds., 
1989) [hereinafter Kaplan, Demonstratives]; David Kaplan, Afterthoughts, in THEMES FROM 
KAPLAN, supra, at 565 [hereinafter Kaplan, Afterthoughts]. 
 43. Gottlob Frege, The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, BEITRAGE ZUE PHILOSOPHIE DES 
DEUTSCHEN IDEALISMUS, (1918–1919), reprinted in 65 MIND 289, 296 (1956) (“The same 
utterance containing the word ‘I’ will express different thoughts in the mouths of different 
[people], of which some may be true, others false.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
572 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:555 
expression as such.44  Kaplan alleges that Frege confuses what Kaplan calls 
content and character.45  Kaplan’s content is essentially Carnapian intension—
a function from possible worlds to individuals, or something that determines 
intension.46  But Kaplan’s character is a function from contexts of utterance to 
content.47  So the phrase “my dog” has a certain character attached to it in 
virtue of the role of that expression (which is in turn determined by the roles of 
its constituents) in our language.  When I speak the phrase “my dog,” I do so in 
a particular context that makes clear that I am the one speaking, and that it is 
my dog that I am talking about.  We plug that context into the character of the 
expression “my dog” and learn the content of that expression on that 
occasion—that is, a function that points to my dog (i.e., Chris Green’s dog) in 
every possible world where I have a dog.  We plug the actual world into the 
function and find that the expression refers to my dog. 
Now, all of this is how Kaplan cleans up Frege’s discussion of indexicals.  
Words do not always pick out referents on their own, but only given (a) a 
context of utterance and (b) a state of the world.  From what Frege says about 
indexicals, it is relatively clear that Frege includes context within Sinn; the 
same word in different contexts produces different senses.48  Some interpreters 
would claim that Frege also includes the state of the world within Sinn, so that 
a change in the state of the world would, like a change in context, produce a 
 
 44. See id. at 296–98. 
 45. See Kaplan, Demonstratives, supra note 42, at 501 n.26, 506–07; Kaplan, Afterthoughts, 
supra note 42, at 568 (“Fregean Sinn conflates elements of two quite different notions of 
meaning.  One, which I called character, is close to the intuitive idea of linguistic meaning (and 
perhaps of cognitive content).  Another, which I called content, is what is said or expressed by an 
expression in a particular context of use.  The content of an utterance of a complete sentence is a 
truth-bearing proposition.”). 
 46. See Kaplan, Demonstratives, supra note 42, at 500–05.  “Just as it was convenient to 
represent contents by functions from possible circumstances to extensions (Carnap’s intentions 
[sic]), so it is convenient to represent characters by functions from possible contexts to contents.”  
Id. at 505. 
 47. See id. at 505–07. 
 48. See, e.g., Frege, supra note 43, at 296. 
If a time indication is needed by the present tense one must know when the sentence was 
uttered to apprehend the thought correctly.  Therefore the time of the utterance is part of 
the . . . thought. . . . The case is the same with words like “here” or “there”.  In all such 
cases the mere wording, as it is given in writing, is not the complete expression of the 
thought, but the knowledge of certain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are 
used as means of expressing the thought, are needed for its correct apprehension.  The 
pointing of fingers, hand movements, glances may belong here too.  The same utterance 
containing the word “I” will express different thoughts in the mouths of different [people], 
of which some may be true, others false. 
Id. 
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different Sinn.49  The advantage of this interpretation is that then Sinn has 
everything required to produce a referent.  Sense determines reference, full-
stop, no need for fussing with qualifications like “given the state of the world.” 
There are at least two reasons to think, though, that Frege would not make 
this move, reasons why he would consider the facts of the world to be separate 
from sense.  First, he repeatedly says that sense is what a word expresses.50  
And while it is plausible to say that a word expresses its context, merely by 
being uttered in that context, it is not plausible at all to say that a word 
expresses the facts about the world that determine what it designates.  Second, 
Frege explicitly characterizes Sinn as the content that gets passed on from 
generation to generation.51  Assuming that Frege thought that the state of the 
world changes, it follows that Sinn can be stable, changes in the reference-
yielding state of the world notwithstanding.52 
David Chalmers’s comments on whether sense needs the facts to determine 
reference, or does it all by itself, seem just right.53  “Strong determination” 
 
 49. See infra note 53; but see Alonzo Church, Review, 8 J. SYMB. LOGIC 45, 47 (1943) 
(reviewing Willard V. Quine, Notes on Existence and Necessity, 40 J. PHIL. 113 (1943)) (“[T]o 
determine that two names or other expressions have the same sense it should be sufficient to 
understand the expressions, but to determine that two names have the same denotation it is 
commonly necessary to investigate the world.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Frege, Sense and Reference, supra note 17, at 214 (“A proper name (word, 
sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense . . . .”). 
 51. See id. at 212 (“[T]he sign’s sense . . . may be the common property of many and 
therefore is not a part or a mode of the individual mind.  For one can hardly deny that mankind 
has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 52. On the other hand, if Frege thought the state of the world does not change, perhaps 
because facts about the future are in some sense already in existence now, then we could rephrase 
talk about “changing” reference to talk about a “temporally variant” reference.  Rather than 
saying the referent changed between 1868 and today, we should say that part of the referent is 
located in 1868 and part of it is located in 2004.  To get the portion of the referent located in 
2004, we would need the temporally uniform sense, plus the portion of the facts of the world 
located in 2004.  In what follows, I will retain the assumption that the world changes, though it 
would not be difficult to translate my theory into the language of temporal variation rather than 
change. 
 53. See Chalmers, Sense and Intension, supra note 30, at 140. 
We might say that sense strongly determines extension if sense determines extension on 
its own, without any further contribution from the world.  In contemporary terms, we 
might say that sense strongly determines extension if any two possible expressions that 
have the same sense have the same extension.  On this view, it seems that an expression’s 
extension must somehow be present at least implicitly within its sense.  While there are 
some indications of this sort of view in Frege, this idea arguably stands in tension with the 
idea that sense reflects cognitive significance.  For example, the two terms “the morning 
star” and “the evening star” have the same extension, but this sameness of extension does 
not seem to be implicit in the cognitive roles of the terms.  It is natural to suppose that 
someone in a different environment might use a term with the same cognitive role but a 
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requires no reference-yielding facts, but “weak determination” does.  
Chalmers’s weak determination is what I will use to present my Theory of 
Original Sinn.  I will proceed, then, on the assumption that Chalmers and 
Carnap are right, and that there is an important phenomenon, which may or 
may not be Fregean sense, but which determines reference only given the state 
of the world.  I may thereby sacrifice some Fregean prestige for my position, 
relying only on that of Carnap, Mill, and their followers, but that seems enough 
to motivate us to think the distinction viable. 
III.  THE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SINN AND THE COURTS 
A. The United States Supreme Court 
The Theory of Original Sinn is in essence an elaboration of the theory of 
fixed meaning and mutable application once endorsed (and never repudiated) 
by the Supreme Court itself.  Justice Brewer, writing for the Supreme Court in 
1905 in South Carolina v. United States, wrote: 
  The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not 
alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means now. Being a grant of 
powers to a government, its language is general; and, as changes come in 
social and political life, it embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are 
within the scope of the powers in terms conferred.  In other words, while the 
powers granted do not change, they apply from generation to generation to all 
things to which they are in their nature applicable.  This in no manner abridges 
the fact of its changeless nature and meaning.54 
Through Justice Sutherland, the Court elaborated on the same idea while 
referring to a statute in its 1926 decision, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
United States.55  The Court appealed to the “universal law of language,” which 
allows that “words do not change their meaning; but the application of words 
 
different extension.  Similarly, it is not clear how the truth of a statement such as “There 
are 90 chemical elements that occur in nature” could be determined by its cognitive role 
alone. 
  Alternatively, we can say that sense weakly determines extension if extension is 
determined by sense in conjunction with the world. It is natural to suppose that the 
sentence just mentioned is true not just because of its sense, but because of the way the 
world is.  Likewise, it seems plausible that a term such as “the morning star” refers to the 
planet Venus not just because of its sense, but because of the way the world is. 
Id.  One of the philosophers most responsible for Frege’s influence, Alonzo Church, read Fregean 
sense as requiring facts about the world to determine reference.  See Church, supra note 49, at 47; 
Alonzo Church, Review, 7 J. SYMB. LOGIC 47, 47 (1942) (reviewing Frege, Sense and Reference, 
supra note 17) (“Two proper names coinciding in sense must have the same denotation—
although to determine the denotation, given the sense, may require settling a question of extra-
linguistic fact.”). 
 54. 199 U.S. 437, 448–49 (1905). 
 55. 271 U.S. 603 (1926). 
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grows and expands.”56  Justice Sutherland said much the same thing about the 
Constitution, writing for the Court later in 1926, in Village of Euclid, Ohio  v. 
Ambler Realty Co.  The Court said: 
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties [sic] never varies, the scope 
of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different 
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.  In a 
changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise. . . . [A] degree of 
elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of 
constitutional principles . . . .”57 
The South Carolina and Euclid doctrine of constitutional change has not 
been invoked much recently by the Supreme Court, but it has not been 
repudiated.58  It is instructive to note that some of the critics of South 
Carolina’s doctrine on constitutional change have explicitly embraced a theory 
of language that denies any room for Fregean sense, as distinct from reference.  
After quoting the formulation above, Jacobus tenBroek condemns it because “a 
word or expression possesses no intrinsic significance; the meaning of a word 
or expression is the thing or things to which it refers.”59  He later stresses, “The 
 
 56. See id. at 607. 
But it is urged that thus to construe the act of 1916 is to enlarge the authority of Congress 
under the land grant acts, so as to permit that body to require the land grant roads, without 
compensation, to perform service in addition to that embraced within the word 
“transportation.”  It is said that railway postal cars originated after the passage of the land 
grant acts.  But it does not follow that such cars are not fairly within the meaning of those 
acts as essentially incident to transportation.  The provision reaches into the future, and, 
while its meaning does not change, its application may well embrace new conditions and 
new instrumentalities which come within the scope of the terms employed.  This is in 
accordance with the universal law of language.  In a sense, words do not change their 
meaning; but the application of words grows and expands with the growth and expansion 
of society. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 57. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
 58. Justice Thomas was the latest Justice to invoke this doctrine, arguing in a separate 
opinion, “When interpreting the Free Speech and Press Clauses, we must be guided by their 
original meaning, for ‘[t]he Constitution is a written instrument.  As such its meaning does not 
alter.  That which it meant when adopted, it means now.’”  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting South Carolina, 199 U.S. at 448) 
(alteration in original). 
 59. Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in 
Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CAL. L. REV. 
399, 415 (1939). 
  Now the striking thing about this statement, and most of those which are patterned 
after it, is not the clear view which it gives of the unadjustability of the intent theory to the 
fact of the changing meaning of the Constitution, but the flagrant begging of the question 
and subterfuge of words in which the Court indulges when seeking to force a process of 
constitutional development into the confines of a theory which describes it as fixed and 
static.  The exact theoretical problem in each constitutional case is one of constitutional 
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meaning of terms cannot be changeless if their application is extensible 
because their meaning is not only determined by, but is the extent of their 
application.”60  TenBroek’s constitutional universe contains only reference, 
extension, and denotation: he allows only a collection of constitutional 
consequences, and no textually expressed meaning that might be stable while 
circumstances change.  He has no room for sense, intension, or connotation.  
Insofar as tenBroek’s position follows, as I think it does, from his rejection of 
any notion of the sense of a word (as distinguished from its referent), it is plain 
that the sense–reference distinction or its kin are critical to maintaining the 
view of South Carolina. 
B. The High Court of Australia 
It is very interesting to add here that the High Court of Australia and other 
courts in Australia have been quite explicit in using Millian language to 
explain essentially the same theory that the United States Supreme Court set 
out in South Carolina and that I defend here.  Justice Windeyer explained in 
1959 in Ex Parte Professional Engineers’ Ass’n: 
We must not, in interpreting the Constitution, restrict the denotation of its 
terms to the things they denoted in 1900.  The denotation of words becomes 
enlarged as new things falling within their connotations come into existence or 
become known. But in the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or 
connotations of its words should remain constant. We are not to give words a 
meaning different from any meaning which they could have borne in 1900.  
Law is to be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be changed as 
language changes.61 
 
meaning; namely, whether the particular matter before the Court does or does not fall 
within the meaning of the language used in the document.  This problem cannot be solved 
by saying that the Constitution “embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are within 
the scope of the powers in terms conferred” or by urging that the powers granted apply “to 
all things to which they are in their nature applicable” because the precise inquiry is 
whether the matter before the Court is or is not “within the scope of the powers in terms 
conferred” or whether the powers granted are “in their nature applicable” to it.  In the 
progress of that inquiry, it must not be forgotten that a word or expression possesses no 
intrinsic significance; the meaning of a word or expression is the thing or things to which 
it refers.  And in deciding whether or not the new matter before the Court is a referent of a 
constitutional clause, that constitutional clause is being redefined and its meaning 
changed. 
Id. (emphasis added).  A bit later, tenBroek quotes Justice Sutherland’s comment regarding 
constitutional provisions: “[T]heir meaning is changeless; it is only their application which is 
extensible.”  Id. at 416 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 451 (1934) 
(Sutherland, J., dissenting)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 107 C.L.R. 208, 267 (Austl.).  A long string of other opinions have followed this 
language.  Justice Taylor explained in 1964, 
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It may, no doubt, be true to say that the ordinary principles of interpretation require that 
constitutional provisions conferring authority upon Parliament to make laws shall bear the 
meaning which they had at the time of Federation but it is beyond question that, although 
the meaning of these terms does not change, their denotation must extend as new concepts 
develop. 
Lansell v. Lansell (1964) 110 C.L.R. 353, 366 (Austl.).  Justice Windeyer added in the same case, 
“The content of a constitutional power is determined by the connotation of the words in which it 
is expressed, not limited by their denotation at any particular time.”  Id. at 370.  Chief Justice 
Barwick noted in 1970, “I can see no reason why, whilst the connotation of the word ‘gas’ will be 
fixed, its denotation cannot change with changing technologies.”  Lake Macquarie Shire Council 
v. Aberdare County Council (1970) 123 C.L.R. 327, 331 (Austl.).  Chief Justice Barwick 
explained in 1972, 
  There are some basic propositions of constitutional construction which are beyond 
controversy. . . . The connotation of words employed in the Constitution does not change 
though changing events and attitudes may in some circumstances extend the denotation or 
reach of those words. These propositions are fully documented in the reported decisions 
of this Court which has the task of finally and authoritatively deciding both the 
connotation and the denotation of the language of the Constitution. 
King v. Jones (1972) 128 C.L.R. 221, 229 (Austl.).  In 1979, Chief Justice Barwick added, 
The full connotation of the description “trading corporation” cannot be displaced by the 
denotation it may have had at any past time. It is a power evidently intended to be 
available in circumstances current in future times.  Like other descriptive expressions in 
the Constitution, e.g.[,] telephonic communication, the description “trading corporation” 
must be allowed to embrace all that may fall within it according to its natural meaning and 
the circumstances of the time at which a decision as to validity or constitutional power has 
to be made. 
The Queen v. Federal Court of Austl.; ex parte W.A. Nat’l Football League (1979) 143 C.L.R. 
190, 208 (Austl.).  Judge Bignold of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales noted 
in 1996, in South Sydney City Council v. C. Maloney Pty Ltd.: 
[T]he connotation of the word in question, has, and necessarily will, remain the same.  It 
is the denotation (or the particularisation of the referents of a word) that is held to have 
changed. . . . [W]hile the connotation of “hotel” has remained unchanged since 1946, its 
denotation has varied over time and today embraces, for example, the use of pool tables 
and casino/gaming machines. 
S. Sydney City Council v. C. Maloney Pty Ltd., (1996) No. 40199, at 14–15 (Land and Env’t 
Court of New S. Wales), available at http://austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/1996/48.html.  
Justice McHugh explained in 1999 in the case Re Wakim; ex parte McNally, just before quoting 
Justice Windeyer’s explanation from 1959, “Where the interpretation of individual words or 
phrases of the Constitution is in issue, the current doctrine of the Court draws a distinction 
between connotation and denotation or, in other words, between meaning and application.”  In re 
Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 551 (Austl.) (McHugh, J.).  Regarding this suggestion and his use 
of it, Justice McHugh went on to add, “Philosophers are now said to regard the distinction 
between connotation and denotation as outdated.”  Id. at 552 (footnote omitted) (For my response 
to this comment, see infra note 63–67 and accompanying text.).  Justice McHugh repeated much 
the same thing in 2001 in the case Re Patterson, also quoting Justice Windeyer’s explanation 
from 1959: 
[T]he current doctrine of the Court draws a distinction between connotation and 
denotation or meaning and application. . . . The Constitution contains terms “intended to 
apply to the varying conditions which the development of our community must involve.”  
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A cousin of the Theory of Original Sinn is alive and well in Australia, but 
is not without its critics and is accompanied by some controversy.  Justice 
Kirby noted his disagreement with the connotation–denotation distinction in 
Eastman v. The Queen, albeit without explanation.62  Further, even as he cited 
earlier statements of the original-connotation theory, Justice McHugh 
commented in the case Re Wakim, “Philosophers are now said to regard the 
distinction between connotation and denotation as outdated.”63  This would be 
an important criticism of the Theory of Original Sinn if philosophers really 
thought that.  But this statement turns out not to be founded on any explicit 
work by philosophers.  The source on whom Justice McHugh relies, law 
professor Leslie Zines, gives no argument against the sense–reference 
distinction, saying only, “Generally, the court has drawn a now outdated 
philosophical distinction between connotation and denotation.”64  Zines does 
not elaborate on why he thinks the distinction is “outdated” and cites no 
philosophers or other discussions; indeed, this comment and its context have 
remained unchanged (and unsupported) from his treatise’s first edition in 1981 
to its fourth edition in 1997.65 
Do philosophers really think the connotation–denotation distinction and its 
kin are outdated?  Obviously, I do not think so.  David Chalmers offered one 
recent extensive defense.66  However, Justice McHugh was also mistaken in 
 
This Court has rarely hesitated to apply particular words and phrases to facts and 
circumstances that were or may have been outside the contemplation of the makers of the 
Constitution. 
Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 C.L.R. 391, 426–27, 434 (Austl.) (footnote omitted). 
“[A]lthough the meaning of a constitutional term remains constant, its denotation—the matters, 
persons or things to which it applies—may change.”  Id. at 434.  Justice McHugh noted in 2000, 
yet again quoting Justice Widener from 1959 and Chief Justice Barwick from 1972, “[T]he 
jurisprudence of this Court has traditionally drawn a distinction between the connotation and 
denotation of words.”  Eastman v. The Queen (2000) 203 C.L.R. 1, 45 (Austl.) (emphases added) 
(footnote omitted). 
 62. 203 C.L.R. at 80 (“Yet the Court, looking at the constitutional words with today’s eyes, 
read them [in another case] so as to derive their contemporary meaning.  There are many similar 
illustrations.  They are sometimes explained by reference to the disputable philosophical 
distinction between the connotation and denotation of verbal meaning.  I contest that 
distinction.”) (footnote omitted).  Alas, Justice Kirby did not further explain his dissent from the 
connotation–denotation distinction. 
 63. 198 C.L.R. at 552 (citing LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 
(3d ed. 1992)). 
 64. LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 17 (4th ed. 1997). 
 65. See id.; LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 15 (1st ed. 1981). 
 66. See Chalmers, Sense and Intension, supra note 30, at 178–79 (“[A] broadly Fregean 
account of meaning is tenable.  On this account, the notion of an epistemic intension plays the 
role of a Fregean notion of sense.  Epistemic intensions are not the same as Fregean sense in all 
respects, but they are similar in many respects, and they allow versions of the core Fregean 
requirements on sense to be satisfied. . . . [T]here is a strong prima facie case that epistemic 
intensions exist and have the properties I have attributed to them . . . [T]he most obvious 
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his suggestion that the philosophical viability of the distinction between 
connotation and denotation matters little to the law.67  I disagree: the 
philosophical viability of the connotation–denotation distinction is surely 
decisively relevant to the law’s use of that distinction.  If a distinction really 
does not work when philosophers think carefully about it in their armchairs, it 
will not work any better when judges think carefully about it in their chambers, 
as they write appellate opinions.  TenBroek is right to this extent: if we really 
do think that there is nothing more to the meaning of a word than the collection 
of tangible objects it picks out, then the Euclidean view of the interpretation of 
an unchanging Constitution and its antipodal cousin are doomed.  To be fair to 
Justice McHugh, perhaps the courts could fashion a different rationale for the 
application of words to circumstances outside the contemplation of the 
Framers, but the rationale they now use should surely be abandoned if the 
distinction on which it is based is philosophically flawed. 
I now turn to three prominent alternative contemporary views of the nature 
of the Constitution, and explain how the Theory of Original Sinn improves 
upon them. 
IV.  BERGER: CONSTITUTIONAL STASIS? 
I have already quoted two of Raoul Berger’s contentions that nothing about 
the Constitution should change.  In fact, in response to one reviewer, Hugo 
Adam Bedau, who pressed Frege’s sense–reference distinction against him,68 
Berger claimed, “All this may be most edifying to philosophers, but . . . . [t]he 
Founders clearly tied ‘meaning’ to ‘reference.’”69  He has been explicit in 
 
counterarguments can be rebutted.”).  One philosopher who prominently dissents from many 
aspects of Frege’s philosophy of language would nevertheless retain the sense–reference 
distinction.  Foreword to R.M. SAINSBURY, DEPARTING FROM FREGE, at i, i (2002) (“Gottlob 
Frege is now regarded as one of the world’s greatest philosophers and the founder of modern 
logic.  In addition to his work on the foundations of mathematics, his writing on sense and 
reference remains deeply influential.  Departing from Frege takes Frege’s work as a point of 
departure, but argues that we must depart considerably from Frege’s own views if we are to work 
towards an adequate conception of natural language.  Mark Sainsbury suggests that the two 
aspects that are most important to retain in Frege’s work are the distinction between sense and 
reference, and the possibility of sense without a referent.”). 
 67. See Re Wakim, 198 C.L.R. at 552 (“But whether criticism of the distinction is or is not 
valid should not be seen as decisive.  What is decisive is that, with perhaps only two exceptions, 
the Court has never hesitated to apply particular words and phrases to facts and circumstances 
that were or may have been outside the contemplation of the makers of the Constitution.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 68. Bedau, supra note 36, at 1161 (“[N]o general term, in or out of the Constitution, in 1789 
or today, ever means the things to which it refers.  For a century at least, philosophers have been 
explaining this to all who will listen and think.”); id. at 1161 n.43 (citing Frege as “[t]he classic 
source . . . .”). 
 69. Berger, supra note 36, at 872–73.  To support this “identification of ‘meaning’ and 
‘reference,’” Berger cites Thomson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898), apparently invoking this 
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insisting that we should allow the Framers to determine both the constitutional 
sense and reference. 
Berger might be called a WWFD theorist.  He seems to think that a simple, 
one-step “What Would the Framers Do?” question can be asked of the 
historical record to produce constitutional outcomes directly.70  But he has 
trouble, I think, dealing with the cases in which the Theory of Original Sinn 
would produce different results: the cases of Framer ignorance and Framer 
error.  Imagine that the Framers of a proportional system for states’ 
representation in the House all thought, incorrectly, that the population of New 
Jersey was bigger than that of Connecticut.  Thinking this, they enact a 
provision: “States shall have a number of representatives in proportion to their 
population.”  So they all thought that the provision they enacted would give 
New Jersey more representatives than Connecticut.  But once the relevant 
later-in-time interpreters conduct a census and discover their mistake, no one 
would say that the effect of the provision should be to give New Jersey more 
representatives, Connecticut’s larger population notwithstanding.  Obviously, 
the Framers would all have been wrong at the time of the framing about the 
tangible consequences of the provision, but they would change their minds 
when they found out the facts.  They would think that their provision fixed not 
actual imagined numbers of representatives, but a function from the relative 
populations to numbers of representatives.  Had the Framers wanted to give 
New Jersey twice the representatives that Connecticut had, they could have 
simply said, “New Jersey shall have twice the number of representatives as 
Connecticut.”  That provision would express a function from possible worlds 
to constitutional outcomes that would not depend on population.  But if the 
provision mentions relative populations, then relative populations obviously 
have to control the outcome, Framers’ expectations to the contrary 
notwithstanding.  We obviously cannot allow those sorts of errors to bind us as 
later interpreters. 
Knowing that the Framers were ignorant of certain facts about the world, 
or might have made certain factual errors about the world, we have to modify 
 
statement: “It must consequently be taken that the word ‘jury’ and the words ‘trial by jury’ were 
placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the meaning affixed to them in 
the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of the adoption of that 
instrument . . . .”  See id. at 869 n. 60; see also Thompson, 170 U.S. at 350. 
 70. For two commentators assuming that originalism is always such an approach, see 
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor 
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884–85 (1995) (“For an originalist to believe that the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbade school segregation, it would seem necessary to show, roughly 
speaking, that a majority of state legislators in a supermajority of the states supported that 
position at the time of ratification.”), and Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, 
Foundationalism, and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal 
Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 829 n.67 (1990) (“[O]riginalism is essentially an historicist 
methodology.  It asks what the actual historical actors would choose.”). 
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our “What would the Framers do?” question.  Instead we must ask, “What 
would the Framers do, if they had the facts right?”  But which facts?  If we 
allow all facts on which we might disagree with the Framers, including our 
substantive views on political morality, the WWFD question reduces to: “What 
would the Framers do, if they agreed with us about everything?”—that is, to: 
“What would we do?”  And we do not need a constitution to tell us that. 
But any attempt to cabin the scope of the relevance of Framer error or 
ignorance will amount to a theory of constitutional change.  Filling in the X for 
“What would the Framers do, if they agreed with us about X?” will tell us 
which attributes of the Constitution are subject to change and which are not.  
The factors falling outside X are fixed, but those related to X are not.  If we are 
required to correct some of the Framers’ errors, we need to know which ones.  
To the extent that it refuses to acknowledge any change pertaining to the 
Constitution, Berger’s theory will not tell us which Framer errors we need to 
correct, or which gaps in knowledge we need to fill. 
Put another way, Berger’s emphasis on the tangible examples considered 
by the enactors of the Constitution does not tell us how to proceed to additional 
cases.  There must be some features of the originally considered cases that are 
not essential to the constitutional meaning.  For instance, for all of the original 
applications of the Fourteenth Amendment envisioned by its Framers, it is true 
that they involve laws and persons that existed between 1866 and 1868.  But 
that cannot be an essential property of such applications.  Without presenting a 
theory of how to pick among new cases lacking properties possessed by all of 
the originally imagined referents of a provision, Berger’s theory simply fails to 
be any kind of theory of an enduring Constitution.  It is instead a theory of a 
Constitution of individual past instances, not a theory of a Constitution of 
categories with enduring contemporary significance. 
Further, as will become clearer below, when I turn to the issue of racial 
school segregation, Berger in his actual work derives beliefs about the 
Fourteenth Amendment too quickly from the Framers’ contemporary practice.  
We must be wary of committing the same mistake that Chief Justice Taney 
made in Dred Scott:71 assuming perfect cognitive coherence in the Framers.  In 
his argument that the Declaration of Independence must have excluded black 
people from its language, because of the existence of other actions by its 
authors inconsistent with thinking that “all men,” black men included, are 
“created equal,” Taney said, “[T]he men who framed this declaration were 
great men—high in literary acquirements—high in their sense of honor, and 
incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were 
acting.”72  Alas, we are all eminently capable of asserting principles 
inconsistent with our actions.  And it is a good thing, too, as our actions are 
 
 71. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 72. Id. at 410. 
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frequently the wrong ones, and we at least want our principles to be the right 
ones.  If hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, it is a tribute worth 
paying.  The possibility of a separation between principles and action allows us 
to think in a principled way about how we act and commit ourselves to 
principles that we later work into practice, rather than having to reform our 
actions first, and only then assert our principles.  To be sure, if we see someone 
doing X, of course we have a reason to think that he does not believe X is 
wrong (or unconstitutional).  But the reason is defeasible and frequently 
defeated. 
It is likewise important to keep in mind the possibility that the Framers, if 
asked a question, would not have had a belief either way.  We surely have the 
power to sincerely enunciate and endorse principles that we know are 
inconsistent with our other actions.  That is, we can be consciously akratic.  
And it is even more obvious that we have the power to sincerely enunciate and 
endorse principles that, for all we know, might be inconsistent with our other 
actions.  We can commit ourselves in ways the consistency of which, with our 
present practices, we are not at all sure about. 
In sum, when we speak to the Framers and ask “Is X constitutional?” 
questions, we must (a) be prepared for Framer ignorance, i.e., allow Framers to 
mark “don’t know” as well as “yes” or “no”; and (b) in cases where we can get 
a yes or no, get a reason why, a reasoned explanation, not just a yes or no.  I 
will apply these lessons to the issue of racial segregation of public schools 
below. 
V.  RUBENFELD AND PARADIGM CASES 
Unlike Berger, Rubenfeld takes as his fixed point merely the central 
cases—the paradigm cases—that motivated the Framers.73  But even though 
 
 73. See Rubenfeld, Moment, supra note 22, at 1107 (“The meaning of a constitutional right 
is forever anchored by these core or paradigm cases.  By building doctrine around a provision’s 
paradigm cases, interpretation will preserve the core historical meaning of a constitutional 
commitment, without reducing constitutional meaning to the will of any particular moment, past 
or present.  Such paradigm cases give constitutional law its interpretive anchor and its root in the 
nation’s history . . . .”); see also Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 22, at 1170 (“Paradigm cases 
form the spine of interpretation on the model of writing.”); id. at 1172 (“[F]idelity to paradigm 
cases is the means by which constitutional interpretation remains interpretation, rather than an 
exercise in rewriting.  It is the constraint that preserves a commitment’s core identity over time.  
So long as interpretation takes its shape from the paradigm cases, constitutional law will remain 
an interpretation of the commitments the people undertook, even though such law neither 
conforms nor purports to conform with popular will at any time in the nation’s history or 
future.”); Rubenfeld, Fidelity, supra note 22, at 1487 (“Let us . . . look at the Constitution as a set 
of written political commitments whose definitive structure is and always remains given by what 
those who fought for the constitutional commitment fought most centrally to accomplish.”); id. at 
1485 (“What keeps the interpretation of a constitutional commitment anchored as interpretation 
of this nation’s commitment (rather than what the same guarantee might mean in the life of some 
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his deference to the Framers’ views about the constitutional referent is more 
limited than is Berger’s, Rubenfeld’s paradigm-case method is subject to 
essentially the same criticisms regarding Framer ignorance and mistakes that I 
made of Berger. 
Suppose that everyone in Congress thinks that North Korea possesses 
nuclear weapons and certain sorts of dangerous intercontinental missiles.  The 
Congress passes a resolution: “The President may use force against any 
country possessing nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles capable of 
striking American soil.”  The motivating paradigm case, everyone agrees, is 
North Korea.  But suppose that we then learn that everyone in Congress was 
wrong about North Korea’s capabilities—in fact, the appearances of nuclear 
weapons and intercontinental-missile programs were the result of a slick public 
relations campaign and scientists who lied to superiors in order to keep their 
jobs. 
Obviously, if the authorization of force were written this way, it would not 
apply to North Korea, despite the fact that it is the paradigm, motivating case.  
Of course, if Congress authorized the President to “use force against North 
Korea,” it would still apply to North Korea, even if that authorization were 
predicated on a mistake.  But not if the authorization explicitly applies only to 
the countries with the characteristics Congress thought North Korea had.  The 
choice of language is a choice about what sorts of changes should make a 
difference to the set of future applications.  The sense of this provision would 
concern the informational content related to nuclear weapons and 
intercontinental missiles.  The intension of the provision is a function from 
worlds to the countries in those worlds that possess nuclear weapons and 
intercontinental missiles capable of striking American soil, and that function 
does not yield North Korea when the actual world is plugged into it.  It seems 
plain that the originally intended referent should give way whenever it 
conflicts with the originally intended sense, applied to the actual facts. 
Rubenfeld has considered this sort of example, in which constitutional 
Framers have the facts wrong about their paradigm case.74  But his rejoinder 
 
other nation) are the paradigm cases.”); id. at 1486 (“So long as interpretation adheres to the 
paradigm cases, so long as it takes its shape from them, it will remain recognizable as the 
interpretation of the principles to which the nation committed itself—rather than as creations of, 
or evolutions into, brand new ones.”); RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 118 
(“Because of the distinction it draws between . . . Application and No-Application 
Understandings, the paradigm-case approach to the meaning of [a] commitment differs sharply 
from an originalist approach, which would take all of [the Framers’] original intentions as equally 
conclusive.”). 
 74. See RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 125–26 (“Say I have committed myself 
to eating no more unhealthy food.  At the time I made this commitment, there was one particular 
dish I meant to put off the table: chicken-fried steak.  In other words, I had an original 
Application Understanding that chicken-fried steak was unhealthy and that my new commitment 
required me to abstain from it. . . . But science proves me wrong.  Chicken-fried steak, it turns 
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seems quite inadequate, and in a way that points toward the Theory of Original 
Sinn as the proper response.  According to Rubenfeld, in the case of a mistake 
by the Framers about the facts regarding the paradigm case, we can still take 
the paradigm case as foundational, “taking the facts of the [paradigm] case as 
they were (mistakenly) taken at the time [of the framing].”75  But what does 
this mean?  One way of reading the phrase suggests that we should abandon 
our disagreement with the Framers, and adhere to the paradigm case anyway.  
That cannot be what Rubenfeld means.  But, just as Berger faced a multiplicity 
of possible modifications of the “What would the Framers do?” question, 
Rubenfeld’s theory is incomplete if he means we should modify the Framers’ 
view of the paradigm case to some extent in order to find our fixed point.  The 
Theory of Original Sinn would say that we should hold as fixed, not the 
paradigm case itself, but a function from possible worlds to cases which, when 
added to the Framers’ view of the state of the world, would yield the Framers’ 
paradigm case. 
The paradigm case is only as fixed as the Framers’ factual assessments are 
reliable.  Certainly, it would be an exceedingly odd situation in which such 
widespread error infects the Framers.  Those who enacted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, for instance, thought it would prevent certain discriminatory 
legislation in the South, the Black Codes, and there is no reason to think that 
the enactors were ignorant in any relevant way about the facts that would cause 
their language to be applied to prohibit the Black Codes.  Were we to learn, for 
instance, that a proposed interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would 
not, in some way, given the facts as the Reconstruction Congress saw them, 
cover the Black Codes then prevalent, it would therefore surely be a fatal 
objection to that interpretation.  It is simply incredible, in that context, to 
imagine that the Framers were all wrong about the application and reference of 
their words.  But if widespread error by the Framers is possible—and it surely 
is—our theoretical apparatus needs to account for those cases too. 
I share Rubenfeld’s inclination to make the original referents—the original 
paradigm cases—as fixed as they can be, within the constraints that possible 
Framer error set for us.  The way to do that, though, is to make the sense of a 
provision fully fixed.  If both the sense of a provision and the relevant facts 
could change, then the constitutional referent would be even more malleable 
 
out, helps build strong bodies twelve ways. . . . Doesn’t this simple example prove that 
Application Understandings can be as erroneous as No-Application Understandings?”). 
 75. Id. at 129.  “[N]otwithstanding the health-food story, there remains a sense in which 
original core Application Understandings cannot be mistaken.” Id. at 127 (emphasis added).  
Rubenfeld imagines that the First Amendment framers were mistaken about a paradigm case 
involving John Peter Zenger.  See id. at 128–29.  He says that, after finding out that the Framers 
were mistaken about the paradigm case, “judges can and should continue enforcing the 
foundational Application Understanding, taking the facts of the Zenger case as they were 
(mistakenly) taken at the time.”  Id. 
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than it must be, merely because of the possibility of Framer error.  Maintaining 
paradigm cases whenever that is possible in light of the facts means 
maintaining the original sense in all circumstances.  That is, Rubenfeld’s 
attachment to paradigm cases, leavened with the possibility of Framer error, 
should push us toward the Theory of Original Sinn.  Only the text can answer 
what sorts of errors should cause us to abandon adherence to the paradigm 
case, for only the sense expressed in that text determines which facts are the 
reference-yielding facts.  The text does not merely pick out a particular 
paradigm case; it does so for a reason, stated in the text, whose sense is 
binding on other cases too. 
Rubenfeld says that the paradigm case adds something that the text alone 
lacks: the commitment was not to particular forbidden categories, but to the 
tangible evils falling under those categories.76  The Theory of Original Sinn 
would agree that the Fourteenth Amendment is a commitment both to its 
textually expressed constitutional sense, and to its fact-dependent 
constitutional referent.  However, the paradigm case requires facts to hold in 
order to be the paradigm case.  The facts that cause the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s text to refer to the Black Codes are to be adhered to because 
they are true, not because they help us get to the paradigm case. 
But if we really take seriously that the original sense of the constitutional 
text is fixed, and that it is the true unchanging foundation both for the 
paradigm case and for other cases, then we must discard an aspect of 
Rubenfeld’s theory that he clearly thinks is critical: succeeding generations’ 
interpretive liberty to craft and enforce additional, different principles that will 
cover the paradigm case.77  The Theory of Original Sinn, though, denies the 
existence of that liberty.  Later generations only have the liberty to assess the 
state of the world: to plug the actual world into the constitutional intensional 
function.  The function itself is fixed beyond the ability of later interpreters to 
add or subtract.  As interpreters, we can only decide what to put into the 
function; that is, we can decide what possible world we inhabit.  But Rubenfeld 
 
 76. Id. at 134 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment is not merely a general commitment to the 
equal protection of the laws, the privileges and immunities of citizens, and so on.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment committed the nation, at a minimum, not to tolerate black codes of the kind passed 
by numerous Southern states in the wake of the Civil War.  Interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment begins with this fact about its meaning.  Any posited interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that knocks out that foundational paradigm case is to be rejected for that reason 
alone.”). 
 77. See Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 22, at 1172 (“There is a floor, but no ceiling.  The 
core prohibitions must be honored, but later courts are free (indeed required) to consider whether 
a right also entails additional prohibitions apart from or contrary to the original understanding.  
Indeed there is even a kind of internal pressure toward expansion.  The judiciary’s task is to 
generalize: to formulate and apply general principles or rules of application capturing the 
paradigm cases.”). 
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argues otherwise, insisting that we can always consider cases other than the 
paradigm with no deference to the Framers.78 
Rubenfeld is emphatic in rejecting an approach like that of Robert Bork, 
who in defending Brown v. Board of Education explains that he aims to derive 
merely a major premise from history, to be filled in with a factual minor 
premise.79  Rubenfeld’s cardinal principle of interpretation is that 
“constitutional provisions are not to be interpreted merely as expressions of the 
democratic will of the ratifying moment, if there was such a will, whether this 
will is rendered in terms of specific ‘original intentions’ or more general 
‘original purposes.’”80  He therefore has denied that paradigm cases can be 
understood as the Theory of Original Sinn would understand them: as the 
result of inserting the Framers’ understood facts into a fixed constitutional 
intensional function from facts to outcomes.81  He has rejected any sort of 
fixed point that is expressed, as is the constitutional sense, in the Constitutional 
text.82  Rubenfeld insists that his constitutional results do not flow from the 
Framers’ use of textual expressions that they selected at the time of the 
framing; they flow from our own work in developing governing principles.  As 
long as we retain the paradigm case, he says, that is enough security that we 
have kept faith with the actual Constitution.83  Contrary to the Theory of 
Original Sinn, Rubenfeld insists that adherence to the paradigm case only out 
of obedience to an authoritative, unchanging Constitutional text would be 
undemocratic.84 
 
 78. See RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 22, at 194 (“No matter how widely 
held, no matter how intensely felt, the original understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
permitted racial segregation deserves no interpretive deference.  The foundational paradigm cases 
of a constitutional right are absolute, but what else it prohibits is always a matter of interpretation, 
reserved for the future to decide.”) (first and second emphases added). 
 79. See id. at 183.  For Judge Bork’s general defense of Brown, see BORK, supra note 36, at 
81–83. 
 80. RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 22, at 183. 
 81. See Rubenfeld, Moment, supra note 22, at 1107. 
 82. See id. (“A Justice determined to read the Constitution as written, and not as a vehicle 
for popular voice, [i.e., a Justice acting as Rubenfeld would prefer] could not be an originalist—at 
least not as originalism is currently understood.  He could neither defer to the sum of the 
Founders’ specific intentions, nor could he try, as today’s ‘soft’ originalists do, to translate into 
present realities the Founders’ more general objectives and purposes, because both of these 
strategies are means of interpreting the Constitution in accordance with the voice of a particular 
historical moment.”). 
 83. See Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 22, at 1172 (“So long as interpretation takes its 
shape from the paradigm cases, constitutional law will remain an interpretation of the 
commitments the people undertook, even though such law neither conforms nor purports to 
conform with popular will at any time in the nation’s history or future.”) (emphasis added). 
 84. See Rubenfeld, Fidelity, supra note 22, at 1483–84 (“[I]nterpretation cannot be wholly 
reduced to the original will or intentions, for then it would have privileged a single moment of 
democratic will and thereby contradicted its fundamental premise, which is that self-government 
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As noted, in response to criticisms about Framer errors regarding paradigm 
cases, Rubenfeld has, in his most recent work, backed away from the idea that 
paradigm cases are absolutely fixed, because the Framers can get the facts that 
stand between the text and the paradigm case wrong.85  But in earlier work, he 
mocked the idea that we can correct the Framers’ factual errors.  Defending 
Brown on originalist grounds (or rather, defending originalism from the Brown 
counterexample), Robert Bork suggested that “equality and segregation were 
mutually inconsistent, though the [Framers] did not understand that.”86  
Rubenfeld’s response is mockery.87  Now, of course, anyone can say that the 
death penalty really is cruel.  But showing its cruelty is an entirely different 
matter.  The Framers assumed three times in the Fifth Amendment that capital 
punishment would be practiced: (a) in referring to “capital or otherwise 
infamous crime,” (b) in referring to those put “in jeopardy of life,” and (c) in 
referring to those “deprived of life . . . without due process of law.”88  Perhaps 
originalists have been a little too quick in assuming that the Framers were right 
in the assumption they presumably made that the capital punishment thrice 
presupposed by the Fifth Amendment was consistent with the simultaneously 
enacted Eighth Amendment.89  And perhaps Bork is a little too quick in 
assuming that the Framers were wrong in the assumption about equality and 
 
must never be reduced to government in accordance with the will of the governed at any 
particular time.”). 
 85. See RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 125–27. 
 86. BORK, supra note 36, at 82. 
 87. See RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 22, at 179 (“[I]f this general-purpose 
originalism rescues Brown, it surrenders all the results originalists demand elsewhere in 
constitutional law.  Originalists have insisted a thousand times that the Constitution was never 
intended to forbid the death penalty.  But a general-purpose originalist could simply say, quoting 
Bork, that the death penalty and abolishing cruel and unusual punishment were ‘mutually 
inconsistent, though the framers did not understand that.’ . . . Even a Marxist judge could now be 
an originalist: ‘equality and [private property] were mutually inconsistent, though the framers did 
not understand that’ either.”) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).  The full context: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. 
Id. 
 89. But only a little bit, I think.  The remaining work would require a theory of the sense 
attached to “cruel and unusual” as used in the Eighth Amendment.  Though I have not had the 
opportunity to review the literature in any detail, here is one theory that seems plausible to me: 
the Eighth Amendment bars extreme corporal punishment, that is, punishment intending to cause 
a lot of pain. That is what “cruel” suggests to my mind, and I suspect it suggested the same thing 
to the Framers too.  However, I would need to do a bit of work to verify the point. 
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segregation; certainly, a fuller explanation of exactly why they were wrong is 
important (and, of course, of great use in deciding other cases).  I will consider 
these criticisms in more detail below.  But Bork’s basic point, which 
Rubenfeld disparages in a manner inconsistent with his treatment of the 
chicken-fried steak counterexample, is merely that as interpreters we must 
somehow be capable of identifying and taking account of Framer error.  No 
one but the most extreme skeptic about our ability to make sense of the world 
would deny that, surely.  Indeed, Rubenfeld has conceded as much in his 
discussions of Framer error regarding a paradigm case.90 
Rubenfeld contends that his approach to considering the possibility of 
Framer error is somehow less dangerous than an approach, like the Theory of 
Original Sinn, which understands the text to fix the level of generality to which 
we should be unalterably attached.  He says: “The higher-level-of-generality 
view—emasculating the core Application Understandings—would in principle 
free judges to ignore, if they chose, every constitutional provision’s 
foundational paradigm cases.”91  This does not seem right at all.  Only if an 
interpreter makes a compelling claim of factual error can he do this; he cannot 
merely “choose” to find the relevant factual error.  And he has the same fact-
finding liberty under Rubenfeld’s views.  We can make factual mistakes today, 
to be sure, but as long as we allow the theoretical possibility of Framer error, 
as Rubenfeld now does, it is simply impossible to make our paradigm cases 
any firmer than the reference-yielding facts.  Only by “emasculating” the 
reference-yielding facts can we emasculate the core paradigm cases.  Our quest 
for certainty may be fruitless, but I would regard our ability to assess facts as 
sufficiently sturdy to give us the security we crave against constitutional 
erosion.  Even on Rubenfeld’s theory, though, that ability to assess facts is an 
essential part of all the security we have. 
The relative reliability of Framers’ assessments of facts, on which the 
Theory of Original Sinn says that the stability of paradigm cases rests, explains 
a fundamental fact on which Rubenfeld relies: the fact that “intentions to 
permit”—i.e., Framer expectations about what their provision would not do—
are not given the attention and deference given to “intentions to prohibit”—i.e., 
Framer expectations about what their provision would do.92  A simple reason 
for that disparity is available to the Theory of Original Sinn: the fact that the 
 
 90. RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 125–27. 
 91. Id. at 134. 
 92. Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 22, at 1171 (“Interpretation of constitutional guarantees 
[of rights] on the model of writing takes its shape from what the Founders understood these 
guarantees centrally to forbid; it accords little or no deference to what they intended them to 
permit.”); id. at 1172 (“[D]istinguishing between intent-to-prohibit and intent-to-permit . . . 
introduces an interpretive asymmetry favoring expansion.  There is a floor, but no ceiling.  The 
core prohibitions must be honored, but later courts are free (indeed required) to consider whether 
a right also entails additional prohibitions apart from or contrary to the original understanding.”). 
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Framers were more reliable in their factual assessments of motivating cases 
simply because they thought more extensively about them than they did about 
expected areas of non-application.  Courts’ unconsidered dicta are less 
persuasive than holdings, precisely because they are less carefully considered.  
Likewise, what the Framers thought about whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
would apply to prohibit explicit racial disparities in the availability of contract 
law is worthy of great, even conclusive, deference.  But what the Framers 
thought about whether the Fourteenth Amendment would apply, say, to protect 
the free speech rights of corporations against state interference is less 
obviously binding on us—simply because the Framers were less obviously 
right about the facts that would, together with the sense of their language, yield 
the constitutional referent in that case. 
Rubenfeld is right that there is a distinction between intentions to prohibit, 
which motivated a prohibition, and intentions to permit, which did not.  But he 
is incorrect to declare confidently the inability of other theories to 
accommodate the distinction, and he is also mistaken to draw the distinction so 
sharply, to an extent that he unduly disparages the Framers’ views about what 
lay outside the constitutional referent.  Just as the distinction between holding 
and dicta explains why intentions to permit have lesser weight, it explains why 
they should have some weight: the weight of dicta.  “Considered dicta” are 
properly given substantial, even controlling, weight,93 and we should likewise 
 
 93. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998) (“The great body 
of this case law supports, either by holding or considered dicta, the position that the privilege 
does survive in a case such as the present one.”); Covington v. Cont’l Gen. Tire, 381 F.3d 216, 
218 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In carrying out that task [of predicting state law], we must consider relevant 
state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable 
data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at 
hand.”) (quoting Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993)); Kennedy 
Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 738 (8th Cir. 2004) (prediction of state law looks at 
“related state court precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, and other reliable sources”) 
(quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 830, 840 (8th Cir. 2000)); McCleod v. 
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 618, 628 (3rd Cir. 2004) (“While this statement is 
dicta, it was considered dicta, which we find persuasive.”); McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life 
Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “we have often stated, ‘[w]e do not 
treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly,’” but “treat such dicta with ‘due 
deference’”) (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 
2000) (en banc)); Johnson v. Life Investors’ Ins. Co. of Am., 98 Fed. Appx. 814, 819 (10th Cir. 
2004) (“[I]n making a prognostication of what the highest state court will decide, the decisions of 
lower state courts and other federal courts are of ‘somewhat less importance’ than even 
considered dicta by the state’s ‘highest court.’”) (quoting Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 
580 (10th Cir. 1989)); Rossiter v. Potter, 357 F.3d 26, 31 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[F]ederal appellate 
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s 
outright holdings . . . .”) (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)); 
United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Carefully considered statements of the 
Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, must be accorded great weight and should be treated 
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treat with deference carefully reasoned opinions about what a constitutional 
provision would not cover. 
VI.  FALLON AND CONSTITUTIONAL MODES 
Richard Fallon’s theory considers modes of constitutional discourse 
pertaining to (1) the constitutional text, (2) the intent of the constitutional 
Framers, (3) constitutional theory, (4) judicial precedent, and (5) justice or 
social policy.94  He sets as his aim “show[ing] how arguments of these various 
kinds fit together in a single, coherent constitutional calculus.”95  His answer is 
to aim for coherence among the modes, and rank them hierarchically when that 
is impossible.96 
I think, however, that the Theory of Original Sinn can accommodate the 
reconciliation that Fallon seeks more simply and without the undesirable 
rigidity of his theory.  I build on my comments about how to approach and 
evaluate the Framers’ views on paradigm and peripheral cases: the same thing 
can be said of anyone’s assessment of the constitutional referent.  To determine 
how worthy an interpreter’s assessment of constitutional reference is of 
deference, we should consider (a) the extent to which the interpreter is likely to 
have properly grasped the constitutional sense, and (b) the extent to which the 
interpreter is likely to be right about the constitutional-reference-yielding facts.  
We should then assimilate Framers’ and later interpreters’ judgments of 
constitutional reference, and we should evaluate both sorts of judgment 
according to these same two criteria.  Indeed, we should also evaluate non-
judicial, or non-federal, or non-governmental, assessments of reference by the 
 
as authoritative when, as in this instance, badges of reliability abound. . . . ‘[F]ederal appellate 
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s 
outright holdings . . . .’”) (quoting McCoy, 950 F.2d at 13, 19); Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 
68 P.3d 936, 945 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (“To the extent the statement is considered dicta, we have 
been admonished to give such dicta ‘adequate deference and not disregard it summarily.’”) 
(quoting State v. Johnson, 15 P.3d 1233, 1239 (N.M. 2000)). 
 94. Fallon, supra note 23, at 1189–90.  For a similar approach, see BOBBITT, supra note 23. 
 95. Id. at 1190. 
 96. Id. at 1286. 
  The solution, which I call constructive coherence theory, has two aspects.  The first 
relies on the central conceptual idea of constructivist coherence: the notion that the 
various types of argument function not autonomously but interactively.  The constructivist 
coherence approach assumes that, even when a tentative assessment of arguments within 
various categories suggests a conflict among prescribed results, the balance of competing 
arguments frequently can be reconsidered in a successful effort to achieve a uniform 
prescription.  Sometimes, however, the strongest arguments within the different categories 
will point irreversibly to different conclusions.  In such cases, the theory’s second aspect 
comes into play.  The implicit norms of our constitutional practice, I have argued, require 
that the claims of the different kinds of arguments be ranked hierarchically. 
Id. 
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same criteria.  The Theory of Original Sinn includes only two modes of 
interpretive constitutional discourse, separated by a distinction that, while not 
completely free from doubt or criticism, has proven itself against extended 
philosophical scrutiny.  On the one hand is the constitutional sense, which 
should be unchanging and fixed at the framing.  But on the other hand is a 
tradition of assessments of constitutional reference, all of which can be seen as 
essentially the same mode. 
Both original history and precedent represent assessments of reference.  
Rather than establishing a hierarchy and preferring one mode over the other in 
cases of conflict, we should recognize that it is possible for either of them to 
trump the other in an appropriate case.  Sometimes the Framers get the 
reference-yielding facts wrong, and later interpreters get it right, but sometimes 
later interpreters make errors that the Framers avoided.  According to Fallon’s 
hierarchy, if the views of Framers and later interpreters on the constitutional 
referent are irreconcilable, we should always and everywhere prefer the 
Framers.97  But cases of Framer error discussed above show why that cannot 
be right. 
Furthermore, recognizing this parity of Framers and courts in the 
assessment of reference can allow us to expand the category so that it is not so 
focused on the Supreme Court.  The presumption of constitutionality, for 
instance, represents deference to legislative assessments of constitutional 
reference.  Lower court decisions, state court interpretations of parallel 
provisions, and non-governmental materials like law reviews and treatises can 
be helpful for the same reasons that precedent and the Framers’ expectations 
are useful: they represent the views of those with an ability to grasp 
constitutional sense and make judgments about reference-yielding facts about 
the world. 
All of these sources should receive the same treatment: they are all 
persuasive but defeasible indications of the constitutional referent.  All earlier 
assessments of constitutional reference deserve the sort of deference the 
Supreme Court described (referring to certain agency decisions) in Skidmore.  I 
quoted the critical language above, but let me repeat it here for convenience.  
Such assessments of constitutional reference, 
while not controlling upon [later interpreters of the Constitution] by reason of 
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which [later interpreters] may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such 
a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
 
 97. See id. at 1193–94. 
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later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control.98 
Indeed, it is not difficult to find expressions of exactly this Skidmore-style 
attitude—persuasive, but defeasible—toward various assessments of 
constitutional reference. 
For judicial precedent, consider Payne v. Tennessee: “Stare decisis is the 
preferred course,” the Court says, but is not constraining “when governing 
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned,” and it “is not an inexorable 
command . . . . This is particularly true in constitutional cases.”99 
For original intentions as expressed, for instance, in the Federalist, 
consider McCulloch v. Maryland: 
  In the course of the argument, the Federalist has been quoted; and the 
opinions expressed by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to be 
entitled to great respect in expounding the constitution.  No tribute can be paid 
to them which exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions to the cases 
which may arise in the progress of our government, a right to judge of their 
correctness must be retained; and, to understand the argument, we must 
examine the proposition it maintains, and the objections against which it is 
directed.100 
For legislative interpretations, consider Myers v. United States: “We have 
devoted much space to this discussion and decision of the question of the 
Presidential power of removal in the First Congress, not because a 
Congressional conclusion on a constitutional issue is conclusive, but, first 
because of our agreement with the reasons upon which it was avowedly 
based . . . .”101 
 
 98. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (setting a standard for deference to 
agencies’ statutory interpretations when a statute does not delegate authority to the agency).  On 
Skidmore deference as a model for constitutional interpretation, see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra 
note 35, at 1149 & n.129 (referring to Skidmore in explaining the relevance of sources of 
evidence of constitutional meaning that are “certainly relevant and possibly persuasive sources of 
constitutional meaning, but that . . . are not authoritative and hence not conclusive.  They are 
evidence of meaning; they are not constitutive of meaning, and hence binding determinations of 
meaning in their own right.”). 
 99. 501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991). 
 100. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819); cf. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of 
The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1998) (“[T]he 
principled textualist must also ask whether a given essay, examined in light of all the surrounding 
contextual evidence, offers a persuasive account of likely constitutional meaning.  To borrow 
from another context, when a textualist judge relies on The Federalist in constitutional 
adjudication, he or she must give serious attention to ‘the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’” (quoting 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)). 
 101. 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] ORIGINALISM AND THE SENSE–REFERENCE DISTINCTION 593 
For all of these examples of earlier interpreters’ assessments of 
constitutional reference, then, we must retain, in the words of McCulloch, a 
“right to judge of their correctness.”102  But the same, of course, cannot be said 
regarding the sense, intension, or connotation of our constitutional provisions.  
In our role as interpreters of a constitutional provision that already exists, has 
already been enacted, and to which we may already have swown allegiance, 
we do not retain the right to judge of the correctness of the rules expressed by 
the provision itself. 
Fallon’s “policy” and “theory” modes are most usefully thought of the 
same way.  Given that the Framers and we are part of the same tradition of 
moral and political thought, our own normative judgments about what the 
constitutional outcome should be, or about what would fit best with the 
theoretical or structural concerns of the Constitution, are defeasible indications 
of what sorts of outcomes a constitutional provision would be likely to 
produce.  If an outcome seems undesirable, odd, or unattractive to us, we have 
reason to believe that it would have seemed undesirable or odd or unattractive 
to the Framers, and so reason to believe that it does not fit with the unchanging 
sense, applied to the facts about the world.  Of course, that reason is defeasible, 
like all other explicit or implicit judgments about constitutional reference. 
VII.  APPLICATION: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND RACIALLY 
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS 
How would the Theory of Original Sinn apply to the often-discussed 
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racially segregated 
schools?  In this section, I will consider what Berger, Rubenfeld, and Fallon 
have themselves said about Brown v. Board of Education.103  Berger criticizes 
Brown, while Rubenfeld and Fallon defend it.  I will argue that the Theory of 
Original Sinn can both accommodate the evidence that Berger uses to criticize 
Brown and do a better job of supplying a positive normative foundation for 
Brown than can Rubenfeld’s or Fallon’s theories.  I will pay particular 
attention to Michael McConnell’s originalist argument for Brown based on the 
debates preceding the Civil Rights Act of 1875,104 and explain how the Theory 
of Original Sinn would use that sort of evidence in a somewhat different way 
than McConnell does. 
 
 102. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433. 
 103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 104. See McConnell, supra note 24.  I should point out that Michael Klarman, who has 
criticized McConnell, uses an implausible version of originalism, very different from the Theory 
of Original Sinn.  See Klarman, supra note 70. 
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A. Brown on History 
Let me first clarify exactly what the Supreme Court itself said about 
history in Brown; its statements are not so contrary to the Theory of Original 
Sinn as they might seem at first.  The Supreme Court’s departure from history 
in Brown, combined with the Court’s eventual vindication in the minds of most 
morally sensible observers, has given great encouragement to critics of 
originalism.  The Court noted famously, 
  In approaching this problem, [i.e., the problem “whether Plessy v. 
Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education”] we cannot turn the 
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
Plessy v. Ferguson was written.  We must consider public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout 
the Nation.  Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public 
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.105 
The Theory of Original Sinn would agree that we must consider the actual 
facts of the world—that is, the world of today—in order to determine the 
actual constitutional referent.  But we are obligated to turn back the clock if we 
are to be sure that we have properly captured the sense of “the equal protection 
of the laws” and the other textual expressions in the Fourteenth Amendment.  
We cannot turn the clock back on reference, but we must on sense. 
The Theory of Original Sinn, applied to the issue of school segregation, 
would delve into historical materials with the initial aim of extracting the 
original sense.  That is, the theory aims to ask of the Framers concerning their 
tangible conclusions why they came to the conclusions they did.  What was the 
textual argument for their conclusions?  The Framers, qua Framers, could not 
be wrong about the constitutional sense, but they could be wrong about the 
constitutional referent.  We must therefore look for reasons for their assertions 
about constitutional reference.  If a Framer says that the Fourteenth 
Amendment would or would not affect school segregation, we cannot simply 
defer to his conclusion, but must find out why he thought so.  The Framers, as 
enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment, have brute legal authority to explain 
the sense of the constitutional language—that language is, after all, their 
language, and is used on a particular occasion of their choosing.  But they must 
explain themselves regarding particular instances.  To be fully perspicuous and 
persuasive to later interpreters, Framers must show how the sense of their 
words, plus the facts of the world, produce the particular outcomes they expect.  
Insofar as Framers do not do this all the time, we may have a puzzle about 
trying to work backward from particular instances to the text in order to figure 
out what sense they attached to their language.  Concerning these referents, 
even those assessed by Framers, we must keep in mind our Skidmore-
 
 105. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93. 
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McCulloch-Myers-Payne rights and responsibilities—“a right to judge of their 
correctness must be retained,”106 while we reject instances that are “badly 
reasoned,”107 and attend to “the thoroughness evident in [their] 
consideration”108 and “the validity of [their] reasoning”109 to see if we have 
“agreement with the reasons” of the Framers.110 
It is important to recall exactly what sort of historical evidence the Court in 
Brown did not consider dispositive, so that we can understand what version of 
originalism, if any, it may have rejected.  The Court in Brown posed a very 
specific question for reargument in its Order of June 8, 1953: “What evidence 
is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures and 
conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not 
contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish 
segregation in public schools?”111  Note that the Brown Court did not ask 
exactly the chief question that the Theory of Original Sinn would ask.  The 
chief historical question for the Theory of Original Sinn is “What sense did the 
Framers believe that the constitutional language expressed?”  The Framers’ 
understandings about the application of that language to specific cases are 
relevant, insofar as (a) we can attempt to work backward from original 
reference to original sense by taking into account the original assessment of 
facts and (b) the Framers’ assessments of facts may be worthy of deference, 
but in no case are they dispositive.  In considering only what specific 
applications the Framers contemplated that the Fourteenth Amendment would 
have, and rejecting that sort of evidence as dispositive, Brown is only rejecting 
Berger’s WWFD brand of originalism, not the Theory of Original Sinn. 
The second question posed by the Court in 1953 is closer to what the 
Theory of Original Sinn would consider, but it is still not exactly the same.  
The Court asked, 
  If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the 
immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the 
understanding of the Framers of the Amendment (a) that future Congresses 
might, in the exercise of their power under section 5 of the Amendment, 
abolish such segregation, or (b) that it would be within the judicial power, in 
light of future conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such 
segregation of its own force?112 
 
 106. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 433. 
 107. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 
 108. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926). 
 111. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953). 
 112. Id. 
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What is important is not so much whether Framers in 1868 considered 
particular then-counterfactuals—though that sort of evidence would be 
persuasive—but the manner in which the Framers believed that their language 
would operate on the facts in general.  That is, the Framers could be wrong 
about then-present conditions, and they could be wrong about then-future 
conditions as well.  The archeologist of Sinn is bound neither by what facts the 
Framers thought did obtain, nor by what facts the Framers thought would 
obtain in the future.  We as interpreters are only bound by the actual facts and 
the Framers’ use of constitutional language to express a function from the facts 
to outcomes. 
B. Who are the Framers? 
Some critics of originalism suggest that originalism has a particular sort of 
trouble in identifying which people’s opinions in 1868 should count;113 
because the Amendment was enacted in a process involving a Congress with 
many members and multiple state ratifying conventions, it is impossible to say 
whose intentions should count.  I cannot here do justice to the problems of 
corporate meaning, but I will say three things. 
First, any theory that places any relevance on what “the Framers” thought 
about an issue must make sense of who counts as “the Framers.”  Those 
theories—and Berger’s, Rubenfeld’s, and Fallon’s theories certainly are among 
these—must also answer these questions.  So the problem of corporate intent is 
not any reason to prefer their theories to mine.114 
Second, the process of making contracts, legislating, judging on multi-
member courts, and innumerable other well-established legal phenomena 
presuppose that meaning can be shared by more than one person: that is, that 
two or more people can share an intention and thus speak corporately.  
Skepticism about group meaning would doom far more than particular theories 
about the Constitution, and we should therefore think it deeply implausible. 
Third, I would gesture toward the law of agency and corporations as a way 
of understanding the verbal intentions of groups.  It seems to me that “The 
People” as a sovereign agent is a legal fiction just like a corporation.  Finding 
out its mental states should therefore be no more or less difficult than assessing 
the mental states of a corporation.  That may be hard, but it is certainly not 
impossible or conceptually confused.  Corporations of course act only through 
agents, and a corporation is charged with the mental states of agents acting in 
 
 113. John Denvir, The New Constitutional Law, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 139, 140 n.8 (1983) 
(reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982)) 
(“Who are the ‘framers’? Did the framers have any unitary ‘intent’?”). 
 114. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Of Constitutional Self-Government, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1749, 1760 (2003) (“Yes, I am assuming that a people can act collectively—that there is such a 
thing as rational, purposive collective decision-making.”). 
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the scope of their employment.  To assess the extent to which an individual 
representative or ratifier’s beliefs or intentions represent the beliefs or 
intentions of The People, we must assess the extent to which an individual 
person is acting as the authorized agent of the sovereign people.115 
I cannot settle these rules in detail; they would require a careful analysis of 
how agency principles apply to the constitution-amending process.  However, 
it seems best that constitutional language should be judged according to how a 
hypothetical reasonable member of the public would understand it.  The fact 
that the Constitution, in becoming law, passed through a critical public gap 
between Congress and the state ratifiers suggests that hypothetical reasonable 
members of the public should be our focus.  Congress approved the 
constitutional language and set it forth publicly, prior to its becoming law, to 
the ratifying states for their consideration and legal authorization.  Because, at 
this point, no individual ratifying body was critical to the enactment of the 
amendment, no individual ratifier’s understanding should be controlling: 
rather, the public meaning as assessed by a hypothetical reasonable ratifier 
counts.  And, of course, to repeat my theory, it is the sense of the provision, as 
grasped by a hypothetical reasonable ratifier, that is the unchanging 
constitutional touchstone.  Originally understood referents of the actual 
ratifiers and originally understood referents of the Congressional Framers are 
relevant both (a) as a source from which, by working backwards, we can 
extract the original sense as grasped by a hypothetical reasonable ratifier and 
(b) as persuasive but defeasible sources of assessments of constitutional 
reference. 
C. Berger on Brown 
Berger relies chiefly on (a) James Wilson’s statement that education was 
excluded from an early version of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s predecessor; (b) Northern negrophobia, which made the 
abolition of racial segregation unthinkable; (c) silence on school segregation 
during the ratification; and (d) congressional segregation of the D.C. 
schools.116  In short, none of these actions were sufficiently explained to be 
decisive evidence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, particularly in 
light of other evidence indicating at least the presence of serious cognitive 
dissonance in the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Given particularly 
the Republican push to desegregate the schools under the Fourteenth 
Amendment just a few years later, the Framers seemed manifestly capable “of 
 
 115. For a different approach to corporate intentions, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, THE 
RULE OF RULES, supra note 36, at 119  (arguing that if no intention commands a majority, a rule 
should have no effect), and Alexander, All or Nothing at All?, supra note 36, at 387–88 (same). 
 116. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The “Original Intent”—As Perceived by Michael McConnell, 91 
NW. U. L. Rev. 242 (1996). 
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asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting.”117  
McConnell gives excellent evidence that the best interpretation of those 
principles is to be one which would desegregate the schools.  If we are to defer 
to such Brown-supporting Republican theories of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
though, there are lessons, however, particularly regarding the resurrection of 
the Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, which we should take 
much more seriously. 
I will first consider the affirmative evidence that the historical sense of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, when combined with the actual facts, would prohibit 
segregation in public schools. 
Charles Sumner gave numerous explanations, shortly after the Fourteenth 
Amendment was enacted, why he thought that the racial segregation of public 
schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment.118  His argument was simple: (a) 
the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the racial abridgement of the rights 
belonging to citizens, and (b) segregation of public institutions was a racial 
abridgement of the rights of citizens, because segregation requires that they 
exercise their rights subject to a stamp of inferiority.  I will briefly present his 
explanation from January 1872.  His proposed bill, initially offered as an 
amendment to an amnesty measure, provided for “equal and impartial 
enjoyment” of common-carrier rights by “all citizens of the United States.”119  
Sumner began by invoking “equal rights promised by a just citizenship.”120 
 
 117. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857). 
 118. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1872). 
 119. Specifically, the bill provided: 
  That all citizens of the United States, without distinction of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude, are entitled to the equal and impartial enjoyment of any 
accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege furnished by common carriers, whether 
on land or water; by inn keepers; by licensed owners, managers, or lessees of theaters or 
other places of public amusement; by trustees, commissioners, superintendents, teachers, 
or other officers of common schools and other public institutions of learning, the same 
being supported by moneys derived from general taxation or authorized by law; by 
trustees or officers of church organizations, cemetery associations, and benevolent 
institutions incorporated by national or State authority; and this right shall not be denied 
or abridged on any pretense of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Id. 
 120. See id. 
  Mr. President, slavery, in its original pretension, reappears in the present debate.  
Again the barbarous tyranny stalks into this Chamber, denying to a whole race the equal 
rights promised by a just citizenship. 
  . . . . 
The precise rule is Equality before the Law; nor more nor less; that is, that condition 
before the Law in which all are alike—being entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal enjoyment of all institutions, privileges, advantages, and conveniences created or 
regulated by law . . . . 
Id. 
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Sumner considered at length the distinction between social and civil rights, 
insisting that the equality pertaining to citizenship—that is, equality of civil 
rights—was enough to support his bill.121  In support of his inclusion of 
transportation on common carriers and in schools within civil rights, rather 
than within social rights, Sumner argued at length from a number of legal 
treatises regarding the traditional rights to use common carriers.122  He argued 
for the same conclusion regarding theaters and schools.  He said of the 
“common school” that it is on a par with common carriers.123 
Sumner also argued at length that legally enforced separation was a 
relevant inequality—a relevant abridgement of the rights of citizens.  To be 
required to enjoy civil rights while being kept away from the dominant race 
with a stamp of inferiority is not to enjoy such civil rights fully.124 
 
 121. See id. at 382. 
There is no colored person who does not resent the imputation that he is seeking to intrude 
himself socially anywhere.  This is no question of society; no question of social life; no 
question of social equality, if anybody knows what this means.  The object is simply 
Equality before the law, a term which explains itself. . . . [N]obody pretends that Equality 
in the highway, whether on pavement or sidewalk, is a question of society.  And, permit 
me to say, that Equality in all institutions created or regulated by law, is as little a 
question of society. 
Id. 
 122. Id. at 383. 
The inn is a public institution, with well-known rights and duties.  Among the latter is the 
duty to receive all paying travelers decent in appearance and conduct, wherein it is 
distinguished from a lodging-house or boarding-house, which is a private concern, and not 
subject to the obligations of the inn. 
Id. 
 123. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. at 384. 
Much is implied in this term, according to which the school harmonizes with the other 
institutions already mentioned.  It is an inn where children rest on the road to knowledge.  
It is a public conveyance where children are passengers.  It is a theater where children 
resort for enduring recreation.  Like the others, it assumes to provide for the public; 
therefore it must be open to all; nor can there be any exclusion, except on grounds equally 
applicable to the inn, the public conveyance, and the theater. 
Id. 
 124. Id. at 382–83. 
  Then comes the other excuse, which finds Equality in separation.  Separate hotels, 
separate conveyances, separate theaters, separate schools, separate institutions of learning 
and science, separate churches, and separate cemeteries—these are the artificial 
substitutes for Equality; and this is the contrivance by which a transcendent right, 
involving a transcendent duty, is evaded; for Equality is not only a right but a duty. 
  How vain to argue that there is no denial of Equal Rights when this separation is 
enforced.  The substitute is invariably an inferior article.  Does any Senator deny it?  
Therefore, it is not Equality. . . . 
   Assuming what is most absurd to assume, and what is contradicted by all experience, 
that a substitute can be an equivalent, it is so in form only and not in reality.  Every such 
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As McConnell points out, the Republicans like Sumner were far from 
alone in distinguishing segregated enjoyment of a privilege from full 
enjoyment.125  Railroad Co. v. Brown,126 decided by the Supreme Court in 
1873, construed an 1863 provision concerning railroad cars, “[t]hat no person 
shall be excluded from the cars on account of color.”127  The Supreme Court 
called the provision of separate cars “an ingenious attempt to evade a 
compliance with the obvious meaning of the requirement.”128 
Equality in civil rights, or equality of the rights of citizens, was the 
constitutional touchstone for Sumner: “It cannot be said, according to its title, 
[i.e., the title of the Civil Rights Act of 1866] that all persons are protected in 
their civil rights, so long as the outrages I expose continue to exist; nor is 
Slavery entirely dead.”129  In line with the language of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause—“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”130—he 
argued, “Our rights are his rights; our equality is his equality; our privileges 
and immunities are his great possession.”131  Senator Sherman explained a 
similar theory of privileges and immunities as those privileges that, in general, 
historically characterize citizenship.132  Senator Carpenter explained his 
 
attempt is an indignity to the colored race, instinct with the spirit of Slavery, and this 
decides its character. . . . 
  In arraigning this attempt at separation as a Caste, I say nothing new.  For years I 
have denounced it as such, and here I followed good authorities, as well as reason. . . . 
The principle of separation on the ground of hereditary inferiority is the distinctive 
essence of Caste; but this is the outrage which lifts itself in our country, crying out, “I am 
better than thou, because I am white.  Get away!” 
Id. 
 125. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 953. 
 126. R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873). 
 127. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 110, § 1, 12 Stat. 805, 805 (1863). 
 128. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 452. 
 129. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1872). 
 130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 131. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. at 385.  The full context of the statement is: 
Ceasing to be a slave the former victim has become not only a man, but a citizen, 
admitted alike within the pale of humanity and within the pale of citizenship.  As a man 
he is entitled to all the rights of man, and as a citizen he becomes a member of our 
common household with equality as the prevailing law. . . . Our rights are his rights; our 
equality is his equality; our privileges and immunities are his great possession.  To enjoy 
this citizenship, people from afar, various in race and complexion, seek our shores, losing 
here all distinctions of birth, as, into the ocean all rivers flow, losing all trace of origin or 
color, and there is but one uniform expanse of water where each particle is like every 
other particle and all are subject to the same law.  In this citizenship the African is now 
absorbed. 
Id. 
 132. Id. at 843. 
  The fourteenth amendment . . . says: 
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as hinging on “the privileges and 
immunities which belong to a citizen as such, and which under that section the 
State cannot abridge.”133 
These arguments represent a simple, compelling interpretation of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause: it forbids the denial of the privileges and 
immunities generally characteristic of citizenship, like those of the common 
law, on racial grounds.  Racially based denial of such privileges is 
“abridgement,” and segregation is the racially based denial of such privileges 
because it imparts a brand of inferiority.  Sumner may go a bit too far in his 
definition of public institutions as including those, such as churches, that are 
merely regulated by the law, as opposed to those, like common carriers or 
schools, duty-bound to serve the public.  But the basic explanation of the 
unconstitutionality of racial public-school segregation and the segregation of 
common carriers fits well with the language of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause in light of its context.  An intermediate “no-caste” principle fits well 
with Sumner’s invocation of the equality of the rights of citizens, based on the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
While it is true that the Supreme Court disagreed with this theory of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases,134 that decision 
seems plainly wrong, for reasons adequately canvassed by others.  It is not at 
all controversial that understanding the original sense of the Fourteenth 
Amendment begins by seeing that the Supreme Court was wrong in 
Slaughterhouse. “Legal scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that the 
[Privileges and Immunities] Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant 
in 1873.”135 
It is useful to compare Sumner and his allies’ textual reasoning with those 
principles that some have thought provide a better support for Brown, such as 
Strauder v. West Virginia136 and Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy.137  Despite 
the fact that they appear after Slaughterhouse, the arguments of Strauder and 
Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent are, like the arguments of Senator Sumner and 
 
  “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.” 
  What are those privileges and immunities?  Are they only those defined in the 
Constitution, the rights secured by the amendments?  Not at all.  The great fountain-head, 
the great reservoir of the rights of an American citizen is in the common law, the old 
charters that were wrenched by our ancestors five hundred years ago and two hundred 
years ago from English kings.  Our rights are not limited to those given by the 
Constitution. . . . You must go to the common law for them . . . . 
Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872). 
 135. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 136. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
 137. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552–64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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his allies, infused with the notion of the rights of citizenship; they seem to be 
infected with the ghost of the Slaughterhouse dissents.138  A fully resurrected 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, in line with the original sense of that 
provision and with Senator Sumner’s arguments against the constitutionality of 
school segregation, would provide much more powerful normative support for 
these intermediate principles, and thus for Brown, than can current doctrine to 
the extent that it rests only on the perceived wisdom of those principles in the 
eyes of present courts. 
Strauder, while it ultimately roots its holding in the Equal Protection 
Clause, bases its rhetoric and reasoning on the privileges of citizenship.  It 
states the question presented, not in terms of the equal protection of persons, 
but in terms of the rights of citizens of the United States: the first question is: 
“whether, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, every citizen of the 
United States has a right to a trial of an indictment against him by a jury 
selected and impanelled without discrimination against his race or color, 
because of race or color?”139  The equality of civil rights and the rights of 
citizenship inform its crucial reasoning.140  The Strauder court quoted and 
glossed the Privileges and Immunities Clause before its critical argument that 
the Fourteenth Amendment required the equality of “civil society.”141  The key 
 
 138. Lochner and other substantive due process cases in fact trace an even more direct lineage 
from the Slaughterhouse dissents.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), relies on 
Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897), which in turn relies on Justice Bradley’s 
exposition of the “civil liberty of the citizen” in Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 
U.S. 746, 764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring), which in turn relies on Bradley’s dissent in 
Slaughterhouse. 
 139. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added). 
 140. See id. at 306–07. 
It was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and 
adopted.  It was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights 
that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of 
the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States.  It 
not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied 
to any State the power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws, and 
authorized Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. 
Id. (emphases added). 
 141. See id. at 307–08. 
[The Fourteenth Amendment] ordains that no State shall make or enforce any laws which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States (evidently 
referring to the newly made citizens, who, being citizens of the United States, are declared 
to be also citizens of the State in which they reside).  It ordains that no State shall deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  What is this but declaring that the 
law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether 
colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the 
colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no 
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the 
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term of Strauder—“legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil 
society”142—fits much better with the language of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, which speaks of the abridgement of the privileges of 
citizens, than it does with equal protection. 
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy is also suffused with the language of 
citizenship and civil equality.143  The “equality of rights which pertains to 
citizenship” is the key, again in line with the language of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, not the equal protection of persons.  After discussing the 
Thirteenth Amendment and then quoting the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
among others, he stated, “These two amendments, if enforced according to 
their true intent and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to 
freedom and citizenship.”144  His famous conclusion lays great stress on 
citizenship, not equal protection.145 
 
amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a 
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,—the right to exemption 
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,—exemption from legal 
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their 
enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. at 308. 
 143. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554–55. 
  In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States 
does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be 
protected in the enjoyment of such rights. . . . But I deny that any legislative body or 
judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those 
citizens are involved. Indeed, such legislation, as that here in question, is inconsistent not 
only with that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National and State, but with 
the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the United States. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. at 555. 
 145. See id. at 559. 
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, 
dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Constitution is color-blind, 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all 
citizens are equal before the law.  The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.  The law 
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his 
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.  It is, therefore, to 
be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, 
has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by 
citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race. 
Id. (emphases added).  Justice Harlan concludes, again stressing the rights of citizenship, “The 
sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional 
recognition by our governments, National and State, of every right that inheres in civil freedom, 
and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the United States, without regard to race.”  Id. 
at 560 (emphasis added). 
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Parenthetically, while I cannot pursue the matter in detail, the arguments 
based upon privileges and immunities seem better suited than the Equal 
Protection Clause to support the desegregation of schools, because I am 
inclined to agree with those commentators such as Jacobus tenBroek,146 Alfred 
Avins,147 Earl Maltz,148 and John Harrison,149 who offer strong evidence 
suggesting that the original sense of the Equal Protection Clause makes it 
chiefly an entitlement to protection—that is, the security of person and 
property—rather than the absence of discrimination.  There is good reason to 
think that the mandate “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”150 rather than broadly forbidding 
purposeful discrimination, establishes the reciprocal duty of government to 
protect all those who must obey its decrees—that is, all those within its 
jurisdiction, or its speaking of the law.  Only after the Slaughterhouse mistake 
were the broader purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause imported 
into the Equal Protection Clause and an affirmative right to protection 
neglected.  A suitably resurrected constitutional right to protection would have 
important implications for issues regarding the role of the state in preventing 
private violence,151 racial disparities in the provision of police services,152 
racial discrimination by criminal defendants in challenging jurors,153 and the 
lower rate of executions of those who kill black victims.154  I will therefore 
focus on the argument from the standpoint of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens. 
According to the Theory of Original Sinn, we should set the arguments of 
Sumner and his congressional allies—who, as McConnell shows, repeatedly 
garnered congressional majorities, though not filibuster-proof supermajorities, 
for their views—beside the arguments for contrary conclusions.  As I have 
emphasized repeatedly, a contrary original understanding of the referent of the 
constitutional expressions is only as strong as its supporting textual arguments; 
we must retain under Skidmore, McCulloch, Myers, and Payne the right and 
 
 146. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 122 (rev. ed., Collier Books 1965) (1951). 
 147. Alfred Avins, The Equal “Protection” of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 
N.Y.L. FORUM 385, 425, 426 (1966). 
 148. See generally Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws—A Historical 
Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499 (1985). 
 149. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 
1433–51 (1992). 
 150. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 151. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).  From 
last term, see Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2808 (2005). 
 152. See Alfred Avins, Equal Protection Against Unnecessary Police Violence and the 
Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 599, 601 
(1970). 
 153. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). 
 154. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987). 
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duty to judge their correctness.  When we use our Skidmore, McCulloch, 
Myers, and Payne rules, the arguments of Sumner and his allies have a critical 
advantage, for the simple reason that their conclusions are reasoned.  It is not 
at all obvious what reasoning may or may not have led citizens in 1868 to think 
that the text they ratified did not affect racial segregation of public schools.  On 
the other hand, Sumner’s arguments in January 1872 that segregation enforces 
through its understood meaning a limitation on the rights of citizens, thereby 
abridging their privileges and immunities in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, are strong and fit with common sense.  The fact that Sumner 
could make such arguments, shortly after the adoption of the Amendment and 
unhindered by the wrong turn in Slaughterhouse, make them a powerful 
indication of the proper referent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s language: 
they are quite likely to (a) grasp its sense properly, and (b) have the facts right.  
While other sources, such as Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent and Strauder, are 
also persuasive, Sumner is particularly so, because he was himself a Framer, 
because he gave considerable attention to the relationship of his views to the 
categories expressed in the constitutional text, and because he was unburdened 
with any obligation to fit with Slaughterhouse. 
Congressional Democratic opponents, however, did provide a specific 
explanation for their contrary conclusions about the constitutionality of 
segregation.  McConnell explains well how their two chief arguments were 
contradictory.155  On the one hand, they argued that segregation was formally 
equal; it gave each group the same rights to travel or to be educated.156  On the 
other, they argued that desegregation regarding common carriers and schools 
would force social equality, not merely civil equality.157  But the argument for 
a right to social inequality assumed that separation was indeed, as Sumner 
explained so simply, an expression of inequality, by telling inferiors to keep 
away.  What the Democratic arguments favored was, in effect, the free 
expression of social inequality within the realm of civil rights.  Public streets, 
common carriers, and schools are simultaneously a social and a civic sphere.  
Those exercising their civil rights regarding common carriers or schools are 
not isolated from social relations more generally, and neither can social 
relations be isolated from the relations among those exercising their civil 
rights.  In conceding that school segregation expressed social inequalities, the 
 
 155. McConnell, supra note 24, at 1016 (“[T]his argument [that desegregation involved social 
rights, not merely civil rights] contradicted the opposition’s other argument: that segregation does 
not constitute inequality and is equally desirable for both races.  Democrats were in the awkward 
position of arguing that segregation does not impart a social meaning of inequality, and that the 
inequality it imparts is merely social.”). 
 156. See id. at 1006–14 (discussing Democratic arguments on formal equality and the lack of 
a social meaning of inequality). 
 157. See id. at 1014–23 (discussing Democratic arguments on the distinction between social 
and civil rights). 
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Democrats conceded the key premise regarding whether it also expressed 
inequalities in civil rights.  On the assumption that there is an overlap, 
segregation can do both at once.  Put another way, Democrats did not argue 
persuasively that segregation in schools or common carriers enforced merely 
social inequality, rather than also  inequality in the enjoyment of civil rights.  
In conceding that they wanted to enforce social inequality, but by failing to 
argue convincingly that civil rights were not at issue, Democrats undermined 
arguments that formal equality was enough and that there was no brand of 
inferiority at issue with segregation.158 
Democratic arguments for the constitutionality of segregation in the 
debates leading to the Civil Rights Act may have flushed out different 
explanations for that position that may have been tacitly accepted at the time of 
ratification itself.  To the extent that they do, they help show us what sorts of 
reference-yielding facts are at issue, and give us the means to explain how the 
ratifiers may have been wrong.  The Democratic opposition to the 
desegregation bill generally agreed that inequality with regard to civil rights 
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.159  It also offered poor, 
contradictory reasons to think either that segregation would not impose an 
unequal brand of inferiority or that only social inequality was at issue.  As 
McConnell puts the point, “[T]he opponents of [Sumner’s] measures could not 
agree on any particular constitutional theory under which segregation could be 
defended as lawful.”160 
Let me, then, review the evidence that Berger presents for his belief that 
the Framers thought the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid racial 
segregation of public schools to see the extent to which it should push us 
toward that conclusion ourselves. 
Senator James Wilson’s March 1866 argument that the Civil Rights Bill as 
originally drafted did not require common schools161 is indeed important 
evidence that cuts the other way.  But examining at the details suggests a 
relatively easy way out.  He was discussing an early draft of the bill that stated, 
in terms very similar to those used to gloss the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, “There shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among 
citizens of the United States in any State or Territory of the United States on 
 
 158. See id. at 1006, 1042–43.  The Democratic argument that education was not a civil right 
conflicted with their main argument that separation was not a relevant form of inequality, and so 
it would be separate, but equal enough.  If education is not a civil right, no sort of equality at all 
regarding education was required.  The Democratic concession that at least material equality in 
schooling was required thus contradicted the argument that education was not a civil right. 
 159. Id. at 1014–15. 
 160. McConnell, supra note 24, at 986. 
 161. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). 
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account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.”162  Wilson defended 
this language, which was later removed, in this way: 
  This part of the bill will probably excite more opposition and elicit more 
discussion than any other; and yet to my mind it seems perfectly defensible.  It 
provides for the equality of citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of 
“civil rights and immunities.”  What do these terms mean?  Do they mean that 
in all things civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race or 
color, shall be equal?  By no means can they be so construed.  Do they mean 
that all citizens shall vote in the several States?  No; for suffrage is a political 
right which has been left under the control of the several States, subject to the 
action of Congress only when it becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of 
a republican form of government.  Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit 
on the juries, or that their children shall attend the same schools.  These are not 
civil rights or immunities.  Well, what is the meaning?  What are civil rights?  I 
understand civil rights to be simply the absolute rights of individuals, such 
as—[Wilson here quotes Kent’s Commentaries] 
  “The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right 
to acquire and enjoy property.” “Right itself, in civil society, is that which any 
man is entitled to have, or to do, or to require from others, within the limits of 
prescribed law.” 
  . . . . 
  . . . [T]his bill, so far as it declares the equality of all citizens in the 
enjoyment of civil rights and immunities, merely affirms existing law. . . . It is 
not the object of this bill to establish new rights, but to protect and enforce 
those which already belong to every citizen.163 
Oddly enough, Wilson’s exposition of “civil rights and immunities” in 1866, 
made in part to explain why it would not apply to schools, is strikingly similar 
to the Republican senators’ expositions of “privileges and immunities” made in 
1872 to explain why it would.  The issue seems to be simply a question 
whether Wilson or Sumner was right about the right to education as one that 
“belong[s] to every citizen.”  While he does not contemplate that education’s 
status might change in the future, Wilson does not take it to be excluded from 
“civil rights and immunities” as an analytic matter—that is, merely from the 
meaning of the term.  In a world, such as ours, where education is a right given 
to all citizens, Wilson would seem able to agree that education would be a civil 
right or immunity.  Suppose Wilson were to come to agree with Sumner that 
education was, like common carriers, “open to all,”164 or agree with 
Representative Lynch, who thought that the desegregation bill “simply confers 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (citation omitted). 
 164. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1872). 
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upon all citizens, or rather recognizes the right which has already been 
conferred upon all citizens, to send their children to any public free school.”165  
Notwithstanding Wilson’s exposition of the sense of “civil rights and 
immunities,” even assuming the phrase is synonymous with “privileges and 
immunities,” he could still agree that racial public-school segregation is 
unconstitutional.  Lynch’s “right which has already been conferred upon all 
citizens and Wilson’s “rights . . . which already belong to every citizen” do not 
represent a difference of opinion regarding the sense of their provisions, but a 
difference of opinion regarding which rights, as a legal/sociological matter, 
belong to every citizen.  Combining Wilson’s sense with the actual facts, 
Sumner’s conclusion is sound. 
The silence during the immediate ratification period regarding 
desegregation is not, of course, decisive under the Theory of Original Sinn.  
Ratifiers obviously need not—indeed, they cannot—discuss, or even know, 
every implication of the constitutional categories they are enacting.  To be 
sure, we might expect discussion of something that important, but the citizenry 
had a lot of other important issues to discuss. 
The segregation of D.C. schools is perhaps evidence that Congress 
exercised its Dred Scott-denied power of “asserting principles inconsistent 
with those on which they were acting.”166  But it is also important to remember 
that: (a) the Privileges or Immunities Clause itself did not apply to Congress; 
(b) Congress did not specifically re-enact a requirement of segregation during 
the Republican control of Congress; and (c) supermajority filibuster 
requirements prevented change in a Congress that included many opponents of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Also, as McConnell points out, there were 
arguments made in February 1871 that desegregation of the D.C. schools was 
required by the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.167  Speaking in favor of a 
proposal by Sumner that would do just that, Senator Harris said: “We have 
adopted the principle of equality in the Constitution of the United States, and I 
think this is a proper place to enact a law in accordance therewith.”168  Sumner 
criticized his colleagues who seemed consciously weak-willed.169  The 
provision for the desegregation of the D.C. schools was, in line with the equal-
privileges-based argument under the Fourteenth Amendment, “for the purpose 
of assuring impartial and free school privileges to every child between the ages 
of six and seventeen years, in the District of Columbia.”170 
 
 165. 3 CONG. REC. 945 (1875). 
 166. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1856). 
 167. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 977–80. 
 168. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1055 (1871). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1053. 
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Likewise, Northern negrophobia is only dispositive if we make Chief 
Justice Taney’s mistake.  It only indicates weakness of will—or, to look at it 
another way, strength of will to be able to assert such high constitutional 
principles in the face of such a racist background culture. 
I should also say something about the reasoning of the early courts that 
ruled that segregated schools were constitutional.  Their reasoning is scarce 
and, particularly on whether enforced separation abridges the privileges of 
citizens by imposing a stamp of inferiority, seems poorer than that of Sumner 
and his Republican allies. 
Roberts v. The City of Boston,171 from Massachusetts in 1850, briefly 
rejected an earlier argument, also made by Charles Sumner, that separate 
schools brand black people as inferior.  While the state did have a 
constitutional provision somewhat akin to the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause barring “exclusive privileges” for particular men or associations,172 that 
provision was not quoted by the court or considered in detail.  The provision is 
importantly different from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, for it is far clearer that a segregationist brand of inferiority 
abridges the privileges of black citizens than that it gives privileges to white 
citizens.  No particular association of people is able to exercise a privilege 
under segregation.173  The court only briefly considered Sumner’s argument 
that separate schools are a brand of inferiority.174  The Court, notably, did not 
 
 171. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). 
 172. The First Part, Art. VI of the Massachusetts Constitution provides: “No man . . . or 
association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive 
privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of 
services rendered to the public . . . .”  MASS. CONST. Part I, art. VI, reprinted in THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 1890 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
 173. Sumner, while he did refer to the provision in his argument, see Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 
Cush.) at 201 (argument of counsel) (referring to “the spirit of American institutions, and 
especially of the constitution of Massachusetts,” and citing Art. VI), asked the court to “declare 
the by-law of the school committee, making a discrimination of color among children entitled to 
the benefit of the public schools, to be unconstitutional and illegal, although there are no express 
words of prohibition in the constitution and laws,” the method by which the court had earlier 
abolished slavery.  Id. at 203–04. 
 174. See id. at 209–10. 
  It is urged, that this maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and perpetuate 
the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in public opinion.  This 
prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and probably cannot be changed by law.  
Whether this distinction and prejudice, existing in the opinion and feelings of the 
community, would not be as effectually fostered by compelling colored and white 
children to associate together in the same schools, may well be doubted; at all events, it is 
a fair and proper question for the committee to consider and decide upon, having in view 
the best interests of both classes of children placed under their superintendence, and we 
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actually affirm that segregation was not a brand of inferiority, but only said 
that it was a sufficiently difficult question that administrators should decide 
it.175  Given the lack of any clear textual parallel to the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause spurring the court to make a more careful analysis, the 
decision is plainly not as persuasive as Sumner’s later argument textually 
anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
State ex rel. Garnes  v. McCann,176 from Ohio in 1872, relied first on an 
anticipation of Slaughterhouse.177  The court also, however, argued that it 
would reach the same conclusion even “conceding that the 14th amendment 
not only provides equal securities for all, but guarantees equality of rights to 
the citizens of a State, as one of the privileges of citizens of the United 
States.”178  The court’s rationale for finding no violation of equality is brief.179  
The court did not consider any argument that separation might be a brand of 
inferiority, but simply assumed that both black and white students had, given 
the equal proportion of the school fund, “equal school advantages.”180  
Apparently, no argument from the Equal Protection Clause was raised, suitably 
enough given the lack of post-Slaughterhouse expansion of the clause.181 
State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy,182 from Nevada in 1872, actually struck 
down on state grounds a statute that forbade integrated schools; the court 
allowed state trustees the option of either separate or integrated schools.183  
The court did offer a brief reference to the federal Constitution, but not to any 
 
cannot say, that their decision upon it is not founded on just grounds of reason and 
experience, and in the results of a discriminating and honest judgment. 
Id. 
 175. Id. at 209. 
 176. 21 Ohio St. 198 (1872). 
 177. The court argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause “includes only such 
privileges or immunities as are derived from, or recognized by, the constitution of the United 
States.”  Id. at 210. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. (“The law in question surely does not attempt to deprive colored persons of any 
rights.  On the contrary it recognizes their right, under the constitution of the State, to equal 
common school advantages, and secures to them their equal proportion of the school fund.  It 
only regulates the mode and manner in which this right shall be enjoyed by all classes of 
persons.”). 
 180. Id. at 211. 
 181. See McCann, 21 Ohio St. at 209 (stating that before the Fourteenth Amendment, “the 
statutes classifying the youth of the State for school purposes on the basis of color, and the 
decisions of this court in relation thereto, were not at all based on a denial that colored persons 
were citizens, or that they were entitled to the equal protection of the laws.  It would seem, then, 
that these provisions of the amendment contain nothing conflicting with the statute authorizing 
the classification . . . . Nor do we understand that the contrary is claimed by counsel in the case.  
But the clause relied on, in behalf of the plaintiff,” is the Privileges and Immunities Clause) 
 182. 7 Nev. 342 (1872). 
 183. Id. at 347–48. 
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of its language.184  The case’s dissent, which would have allowed the school 
trustees to exclude black children entirely, adds a little bit more analysis in its 
agreement on this point, relying on the claim that education was not a right of 
citizens.185  The court’s statement in dicta that separate schools would be 
allowed under the state constitution186 relied entirely on Massachusetts’s 
Roberts and on a decision from Ohio in 1859, Van Camp v. Board of 
Education of Logan,187 which had interpreted the meaning of “colored 
children” in separate-schools legislation without subjecting that statute to any 
constitutional scrutiny.  The analysis of Duffy is too minimal to be persuasive 
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, and because of its holding, the court 
was not squarely faced with the constitutionality of segregation. 
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton,188 from a New York trial court in 1872, 
relied on formal equality.  Like Ohio’s McCann, the court anticipated 
Slaughterhouse.189  The court then assumed without argument that “equal 
common school advantages” were not imperiled by segregation.190  Like 
 
 184. See id. at 346, where the court said only this: 
[R]elator replies, that such statute is opposed to the constitution and laws of the United 
States; and to the constitution of the state of Nevada. 
  While it may be, and probably is, opposed to the spirit of the former, still it is not 
obnoxious to their letter; and as no judicial action is more dangerous than that most 
tempting and seductive practice of reading between the written lines, and interpolating a 
spirit and intent other than that to be reached by ordinary and received rules of 
construction or interpretation; such course will be declined, and reference at once had to 
the constitution of this state. 
 185. See id. at 355 (Garber, J., dissenting). 
I fully agree with my associates that this position of counsel [that the Fourteenth 
Amendment bars segregated schools] is utterly untenable.  The statute does not abridge 
any privilege or immunity of the applicant, as a citizen of the United States.  The privilege 
of admission to the common schools of this state is no more inherent in or connected with 
the status of citizenship than is the elective franchise; and to secure that against unfriendly 
state legislation, an additional amendment was required and was proposed. 
Id. 
 186. Id. at 348. 
 187. 9 Ohio St. 407 (1859). 
 188. 13 Abb. Pr. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872). 
 189. “There is some reason for believing that the privileges and immunities there referred to 
are those only which arise under the Constitution of the United States, and not those which arise 
under State laws.”  Id. at 164. 
 190. See id. at 164–65. 
[W]hat privilege of a citizen is abridged thereby?  Certainly none, unless every citizen has 
the privilege of choosing to which school, in a city, he will send his children.  The relator 
has equal common school advantages with other citizens.  He does not assert that the 
school which is open to him is not as good as the one which is closed.  He does not 
pretend that there is anything in its position, its pupils, or its teachers, which makes the 
limitation of his children to that school a practical refusal to them of common school 
advantages. 
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McCann, the court simply did not consider whether a brand of racial inferiority 
through separation was an abridgement of schooling privileges. 
Ward v. Flood,191 from California in 1874, dismissed the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause quickly and relied entirely on Roberts to reject a challenge 
based on equal protection.192  After a long quotation from Roberts, the court 
said simply, “We concur in these views, and they are decisive of the present 
controversy.”193  Given the weakness of Roberts and Slaughterhouse as guides 
to the Fourteenth Amendment, Ward is not compelling. 
Cory v. Carter,194 from Indiana in 1874, relied heavily on Slaughterhouse, 
quoting it for three pages.195  The court briefly dismissed equal protection, 
which had not yet received any expansive interpretation in light of 
Slaughterhouse, with a quotation from Ohio’s McCann, where the issue was 
not raised.196 
Bertonneau v. Board of Directors of City Schools,197 decided by Circuit 
Judge (soon to be Justice) Woods in 1878, briefly dismissed a challenge to 
segregation under the Equal Protection Clause.  His reasoning did not consider 
any sort of argument that a racial brand of inferiority abridges rights.198  
Woods begged the question entirely about whether “equal school advantages” 
 
Id. 
 191. 48 Cal. 36 (1874). 
 192. See id. at 53, where the key section of the opinion asserted: 
  It will be seen that the language of the Massachusetts Constitution prohibiting 
“particular and exclusive privileges,” was fully as significant, to say the least, in its 
bearing on the general question in hand as is that of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution, securing “the equal protection of the laws.” 
 193. Id. at 56. 
 194. 48 Ind. 327 (1874). 
 195. See id. at 350–52. 
 196. Id. at 355 (“It would seem . . . that these provisions of the amendment contain nothing 
conflicting with the statute authorizing the classification in question . . . . Nor do we understand 
that the contrary is claimed by counsel . . . .”) (quoting State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio 
St. 198, 209 (1871)). 
 197. 3 F. Cas. 294 (1878) (No. 1361). 
 198. See id. at 296, where Judge Woods said only: 
Both races are treated precisely alike.  White children and colored children are compelled 
to attend different schools.  That is all.  The state, while conceding equal privileges and 
advantages to both races, has the right to manage its schools in the manner which, in its 
judgment, will best promote the interest of all. 
  The state may be of opinion that it is better to educate the sexes separately, and 
therefore establishes schools in which the children of different sexes are educated apart.  
By such a policy can it be said that the equal rights of either sex are invaded?  Equality of 
right does not involve the necessity of educating children of both sexes, or children 
without regard to their attainments or age in the same school.  Any classification which 
preserves substantially equal school advantages does not impair any rights, and is not 
prohibited by the constitution of the United States.  Equality of rights does not necessarily 
imply identity of rights. 
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are given by a system that imposes a brand of racial inferiority by telling 
blacks to keep away from whites.  He did not consider Sumner’s compelling 
argument to the contrary. 
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher,199 from New York in 1883, relied on the 
claim that separate schools themselves—that is, schools for black children—
are not likely to been seen as a disadvantage.200  The argument is very poor: it 
is not the separate facilities themselves, but the exclusion from the general 
facilities for other citizens, that is a badge of inferiority.  The dissenters in 
Gallagher are far more persuasive.201  The recognition by the Gallagher 
dissenters of how the privileges of citizenship were impaired by segregation is 
telling. 
Lehew v. Brummell,202 from Missouri in 1891, assumed without argument, 
like Gallagher and McCann, on which it relied, that no inequality of school 
privileges was at stake in segregation.203  Like the courts in Gallagher and 
McCann, the Missouri court did not consider the argument that being required 
to receive an education under a badge of inferiority would abridge such a 
privilege: “It is to be observed, in the first place, that these persons are not 
denied the advantages of the public schools.  The right to attend such schools, 
and receive instruction thereat, is guarantied [sic] to them.”204  The court 
 
 199. 93 N.Y. 438 (1883). 
 200. See id. at 457. 
  It is not discrimination between the two races which is prohibited by law, but 
discrimination against the interests of the colored race.  We cannot conceive it to be 
possible that it can be successfully maintained that in the establishment of schools, 
asylums, hospitals and charitable institutions for the exclusive enjoyment of particular 
races or classes, that the founders thereof are justly subject to the imputation of unfriendly 
conduct toward the class for whom such institutions are designed. 
Id. 
 201. See id. at 465–66 (Danforth, J., joined by Finch, J., dissenting). 
[A]ny regulation by which the black is kept in a state of separation is in fact one of 
exclusion and represents the sentiment by which the white assumed to be the superior 
race, a discrimination against which the law is now directly aimed. . . . 
  . . . . 
  In the case before us the city is under no obligation to maintain a separate school for 
children of color.  But the objection is not to its existence; the objection is that the relator 
is compelled to attend it because of her color, and so is excluded from schools to which 
children of another race are permitted to resort.  The exaction is, therefore, unequal, and 
is, I think, in violation of the law which gives to all children, within the several districts, 
an equal right, in like cases and under like circumstances, to go to those schools for 
education.  I am, therefore, led to the conclusion that the relator, on account of her color, 
has been prevented, by a public officer and by ordinance or regulation, from enjoying an 
accommodation or privilege to which, as a citizen of this State, she is entitled. 
Id. 
 202. 15 S.W. 765 (Mo. 1891). 
 203. Id. at 766–67. 
 204. Id. at 766. 
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thought that the Massachusetts case from 1850, Roberts, had considered “a 
constitutional provision similar to the fourteenth amendment.”205  As I explain 
above, that assumption is not accurate. 
In sum, there is virtually no serious consideration in these cases of whether 
segregation impairs educational advantages by imparting a stamp of inferiority.  
In the wake of Slaughterhouse, careful thinking about the privileges of 
citizenship was short-circuited. 
The Plessy majority, dealing with mandatory segregation in transportation 
in 1896, did finally make an effort to rebut the charge that segregation imposes 
a brand of inferiority, but their argument was quite poor.  The Court said, 
  We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in 
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored 
race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it.  The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been 
more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race 
should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should enact a 
law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to an 
inferior position.  We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce 
in this assumption.  The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be 
overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro 
except by an enforced commingling of the two races.206 
The Court argues that its members’ white racial pride would be enough to 
withstand a segregationary insult, were the situation reversed.  But the 
hardiness of the victims’ self-confidence, notwithstanding the insult, does not 
mean that there has been no insult.  The existence of a racial brand of 
inferiority does not depend on whether the victim race believes that it is 
inferior.  The fact that separation is a means by which the white majority 
expresses its belief in black citizens’ inferiority is not changed by the fact that 
the minority “would not acquiesce in this assumption.”207  If I am forced to 
receive a tattoo on my forehead that says “Defective,” I have been branded as 
inferior, whether I believe it or not.  My failure to acquiesce in the assumption 
that the brand is true is beside the point.  Charles Black’s comment on this 
“solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction on it” 
argument is just right: “The curves of callousness and stupidity intersect at 
their respective maxima.”208  Plessy’s second argument, doubting that “social 
prejudices may be overcome by legislation,”209 is really somewhat bizarre as a 
 
 205. Id. at 767. 
 206. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 
422 n.8 (1960). 
 209. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
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defense of a law that compelled the segregation of common carriers.  The 
contention that a legislative insult through segregation is an abridgement of 
privileges does not assume in any way that, without such an insult, social 
prejudices will disappear; the claim is only that such social prejudices may not 
be expressed in legislation limiting civil rights. 
Further, the reasoning of cases that strike down segregation on state 
grounds is persuasive, insofar as it recognizes how the enforcement of a racial 
brand of inferiority through separation operates to abridge the enjoyment of a 
privilege.  Indeed, it might be said that, after Slaughterhouse, cases interpreting 
state provisions analogous to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but which 
were not strangled in the crib, are a better guide to the proper interpretation of 
the actual federal Privileges and Immunities Clause than are cases considering 
federal challenges under the Equal Protection Clause, pressed into textually 
awkward service to fill the privileges-and-immunities void, or cases that follow 
Slaughterhouse’s mistake. 
Clark v. Board of Directors,210 from Iowa in 1868, considered a 
constitutional requirement that the school board “provide for the education of 
all the youths of the State, through a system of common schools.”211  The court 
compared race to nationality.212  “Equal privileges” was the key category 
which segregation violated, making the case persuasive regarding the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.213 
People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Education of Detroit,214 from 
Michigan in 1869, held that a statutory requirement that “[a]ll residents of any 
district shall have an equal right to attend any school therein”215 prohibited 
 
 210. 24 Iowa 266 (1868). 
 211. Id. at 271. 
 212. See id. at 276. 
Our statute does not, either in letter or in spirit, recognize or justify any such distinction or 
limitations of right or privilege on account of nationality.  For the courts to sustain a board 
of school directors or other subordinate board or officer in limiting the rights and 
privileges of persons by reason of their nationality, would be to sanction a plain violation 
of the spirit of our laws not only, but would tend to perpetuate the national differences of 
our people and stimulate a constant strife, if not a war of races. 
Id. 
 213. See id. 
  Our statute has expressed the sovereign will, that all the youths of the State between 
the ages of five and twenty-one years shall be entitled to all the privileges and benefits of 
our common schools, and it is not competent for the board of directors to resist that 
sovereign will and declare, that, since “public sentiment in their district is opposed to the 
intermingling of the white and colored children in the same school,” they will deny equal 
privileges to some of the youths. 
Id. 
 214. 18 Mich. 400 (1869). 
 215. Id. at 409. 
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segregation.216  The court saw that “equal rights”—the same concept 
underlying the Privileges and Immunities Clause—forbade segregation. 
Board of Education of Ottawa v. Tinnon,217 from Kansas in 1881, relied on 
the United States Supreme Court’s 1873 Railroad Co. v. Brown in recognizing 
that segregation would violate a requirement for schools “free to all children 
residing in such city.”218  The court argued, “[I]f only one school out of all the 
schools of a city of the second class is free for colored children to attend, is 
that maintaining common schools, free to all the children of the city?”219 The 
court followed Iowa’s Clark in striking down segregation on state grounds, and 
suggested that Strauder was inconsistent with the cases finding segregation 
constitutional under federal law.220 
Chase v. Stephenson,221 from Illinois in 1874, held that local authorities 
lacked the power to segregate public schools, which were to be open to 
everyone.  While the court cited no authorities, its reasoning suggests that 
segregation would be a denial of equal civil rights.222  In 1882, the court 
clarified Chase in People ex rel. Longress v. Board of Education of Quincy.223  
It adhered to its views in Chase and gave a fuller explanation, noting that given 
a statute under which districts were “prohibited from excluding, directly or 
indirectly, any such child from school on account of the color of such child,”224 
segregation was prohibited.  The court’s rationale fits well with the pre-
 
 216. Justice Cooley, one of the top constitutional scholars of the century, wrote for the Court, 
  It cannot be seriously urged that with this provision in force, the school board of any 
district which is subject to it may make regulations which would exclude any resident of 
the district from any of its schools, because of race or color, or religious belief, or 
personal peculiarities.  It is too plain for argument that an equal right to all the schools, 
irrespective of all such distinctions, was meant to be established. 
Id. at 409–10. 
 217. 26 Kan. 1 (1881). 
 218. Id. at 20. 
 219. Id. at 20.  The Court added, “[U]nder [Railroad Co. v. Brown], railroad cars are not free 
to a person who is excluded from all but one of them; and, on the same principle, schools are not 
free to a person who is excluded from all but one of them.”  Id. at 21. 
 220. See id. at 23. 
 221. 71 Ill. 383 (1874). 
 222. See id. at 385. 
  The free schools of the State are public institutions, and in their management and 
control the law contemplates that they should be so managed that all children within the 
district, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, regardless of race or color, shall 
have equal and the same right to participate in the benefits to be derived therefrom. 
  While the directors, very properly, have large and discretionary powers in regard to 
the management and control of schools, in order to increase their usefulness, they have no 
power to make class distinctions, neither can they discriminate between scholars on 
account of their color, race or social position. 
Id. 
 223. 101 Ill. 308 (1882). 
 224. Id. at 314. 
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Slaughterhouse equality-of-citizenship argument against segregation.225  As in 
Railroad Co. v. Brown, “exclusion” encompassed segregation, supporting the 
conclusion that “abridgement” would as well. 
Finally, Commonwealth v. Davis,226 from a Pennsylvania trial court in 
1881, is also very interesting in holding, relying on the Slaughterhouse 
dissents,227 that the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires desegregation.  
Legislative desegregation mooted any appeal, but the court’s reasoning fits 
well with the Republican pre-Slaughterhouse argument.228  The court offered a 
creative argument that education is included within “property,”229 and 
 
 225. See id. at 314–15. 
  Under the amendment of the constitution of the United States, persons of color are 
citizens of the United States, and of the State where they may reside. Being citizens of the 
State, upon an equality with other citizens, there can be no doubt in regard to the power of 
the legislature to provide that no discrimination shall be made on account of color by 
boards of education who have the management and control of our free schools. . . . Under 
the rules adopted, these colored children are excluded from the public schools in the 
district where they reside, and are all required to attend a school composed exclusively of 
colored children, known as the Lincoln school.  Under the operation of these rules a 
colored child cannot attend the school in the district where such child resides, on account 
of its color, but is compelled to travel perhaps several miles to a distant part of the city to 
a colored school.  This is a direct violation of the statute, which says the board is 
prohibited from excluding, directly or indirectly, any such child from such school on 
account of color. 
Id. 
 226. 10 Weekly Notes of Cases Pa.C. 156 (Crawford County C.P. 1881). 
 227. Id. at 158 (relying on Justice Swayne’s Slaughterhouse dissent, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 
124 (1872)). 
 228. See id. 
  The “privileges and immunities” of a citizen of the United States include among 
other things the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, and also the rights which 
pertain to him by reason of his membership in the Union, among which may be included 
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 
happiness and safety, subject only to such restraints as the government may provide for 
the general good of the whole. . . . A citizen of the United States is not bound to cringe to 
any superior, or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens. 
Id. 
 229. See id. at 159. 
  The privileges and immunities therefore, of every citizen of the United States which 
are prohibited by the XIVth Amendment from being abridged by the State, I have shown 
to include the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, with the right to acquire 
and possess the same freely and equally.  This property is everything which has an 
exchangeable value, and the right of property includes the power to dispose of it 
according to the will of the owner.  Labor is property; education is property.  It is entitled 
to protection without abridgement.  The right to make this species of property available is 
next in importance to the right of life and liberty.  It lies to a large extent at the foundation 
of most other forms of property and of all solid individual and national prosperity. 
Id. 
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suggested that segregation comes close to violating even the Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibition on involuntary servitude.230  As “involving . . . the 
very personification of caste,”231 segregation was an insulting badge of 
inferiority.232  In short, while it may betray a dangerous degree of state-court 
independence from the Supreme Court, Davis suggests additional strength, 
even post-Slaughterhouse, in the view that segregation abridges a privilege of 
citizens by imposing a brand of inferiority in the civic realm. 
D. McConnell’s Theoretical Commitments 
In stressing the apparent superiority of the reasoning of Sumner and his 
allies, and depending on McConnell’s important historical research, I have a 
few important quibbles with McConnell’s theoretical approach.  He notes, 
  As an initial matter, it is clear beyond peradventure that a very substantial 
portion of the Congress, including leading framers of the Amendment, 
subscribed to the view that school segregation violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At a minimum, therefore, the scholarly consensus must be 
corrected to admit that this interpretation is within the legitimate range of 
interpretations of the Amendment on originalist grounds.  But is it possible to 
say more: that this interpretation was the prevailing, or preponderant, view, 
and thus the best understanding of the original meaning?233 
 
 230. See id. at 160. 
[W]hen a law makes a discrimination between classes of persons, and one which deprives 
the one class of their freedom or their property (in the sense I have heretofore used the 
word property) or which makes a caste of them to subserve the pride or vanity of others, 
or which deprives one citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens, it would 
seem to be an encroachment of his liberty, and a badge of servitude which is prohibited by 
the Constitution. 
Id. 
 231. Davis, 10 Weekly Notes of Cases Pa.C. at 160. 
 232. See id. 
I can see nothing destructive to our institutions in the demolition of the legal barriers that 
have been erected so long and so high between the colored race, and their natural, civil, 
and political rights and liberties. 
  The white race owes the colored race at least fair play in their great struggle for 
education and improvement and advancement, which they are making, and have a right to 
make in their recently emancipated condition. 
  If, after being accorded equal advantages and freedom from petty tyranny and 
studied insult, and the incentive to self-respect which is meted to others, the colored man 
then falls behind in the great race for human progress, it will then be time to talk of the 
moral and intellectual inferiority of his race.  Nothing but gross uncharitableness can be 
jealous or envious of advancement and progress founded upon true merit. 
Id. 
 233. McConnell, supra note 24, at 1093 (footnote omitted). 
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McConnell says that he is searching for the “prevailing, or preponderant, view, 
and thus the best understanding of the original meaning,”234 and conducts 
extensive analyses of the votes to verify that, among congressional supporters 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is indeed good reason to think that a 
desegregationary intent was more prevalent.  But the Theory of Original Sinn 
would not see prevailing assessments of reference as necessarily correct.  The 
central examples I used to motivate the theory assume that all the Framers can 
be wrong about the constitutional referent, because they can all be wrong about 
the facts.  It is obviously more important that Sumner’s reasoning regarding the 
manner in which the social meaning of segregation abridges civil rights, and 
therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment, is persuasive than that it was 
widely accepted.  Of course, wide acceptance is probative of persuasiveness, 
but not dispositive.  Citing dissents is not, other things being equal, as good as 
citing majority opinions, but depending on the case, it can be the right thing to 
do. 
Also, McConnell at one point suggests (albeit mildly, through his reliance 
on another’s arguments) that a Berger-style “What Would the Framers Do?” 
question is the critical one.  McConnell relies on an article by Robert Lipkin 
for the idea that “abstract values, as opposed to concrete intentions, are a 
problematic basis for originalism.”235  Lipkin’s argument in the footnote on 
which McConnell relies asserts that “originalism is essentially an historicist 
methodology.  It asks what the actual historical actors would choose.”236  But 
this is Berger’s WWFD approach, and is thus subject to fatal criticism in cases 
where the Framers are ignorant or wrong about critical factual questions.  
Indeed, it is an approach that McConnell himself earlier criticized 
compellingly, if briefly, in condemning “those who interpret the Constitution 
as if it froze into place the conclusions reached at the time of the framing about 
the application of constitutional principles to concrete situations.”237  
McConnell’s new preference for the concrete is unfortunate.  The sense 
expressed by the text is always, to the extent that it relies on facts to produce 
reference, more or less “abstract.”  Unless the text employs a name or other 
device for directly picking out a referent without relying on some sort of 
factual property of the referent, there is no avoiding a degree of abstraction in 
interpretation.  We must supplement the historically extracted sense with the 
actual facts, not necessarily the facts as the Framers saw them.  If this is not 
“originalism,” so be it. 
McConnell insists stoutly, and properly, on distinguishing results that 
might have been preferred on policy grounds from those that were the result of 
 
 234. Id. (emphasis added). 
 235. Id. at 952 n.14 (citing Robert Justin Lipkin, supra note 70, at 829 n. 67). 
 236. Lipkin, supra note 70, at 829 n.67. 
 237. McConnell, supra note 36, at 361–62. 
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constitutional interpretation.  But he would do well to distinguish results that 
were the result of proper constitutional interpretation, and a proper assessment 
of the reference-yielding facts, from those that might not have been.  The 
Theory of Original Sinn requires no attachment to predominant opinions being 
correct.  With such a standard, the Theory of Original Sinn will thus have, in 
one way, an easier time than McConnell of showing the consistency of Brown 
with its brand of originalism. 
It is not necessary that our view about the reference-yielding facts be 
preponderant or prevailing among the Founders, and it is also not sufficient.  
McConnell’s work showing the prevalence of Sumner’s views is therefore, as 
well as not strictly being required, not enough.  Preponderant error is possible.  
Also, an emphasis on the reasoning involved will cause problems for some of 
the evidence that McConnell marshals, because it is based in part on the votes 
in Congress, and accompanying constitutional interpretation, which are 
themselves based on a post-Slaughterhouse shift to the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Shifting grounds in this way is understandable, but it undermines the 
Republicans’ textual argument.  McConnell dismisses one criticism by Earl 
Maltz by saying that it “is significant not to whether school segregation was 
understood as unconstitutional, but to the nice question of which Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the source of that constitutional principle.”238  He 
notes that he “treated the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the dominant and 
most plausible source of constitutional authority prior to Slaughterhouse, and 
assumed that the shift to equal protection after Slaughterhouse was simply a 
tactical response to that decision.”239  Such a tactical response, recognized as 
such, is not persuasive evidence of the correct interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  McConnell argues that the distinction between the theories 
“is of theoretical interest to those who are concerned about the relation 
between the three substantive Clauses of Section One as originally understood, 
but it does not affect the originalist case for Brown.”240  Because the 
Republicans’ textual argument is critical to their reasoning, however, the 
relation between the clauses is essential to an evaluation of their position under 
the Theory of Original Sinn, whether or not it would be important to “the 
originalist case for Brown.” 
Likewise, Strauder and Harlan’s Plessy dissent deploy a rhetoric of the 
rights of citizens to which they are not really entitled, unless they mean to undo 
the Slaughterhouse mistake. Only a resurrected Privileges and Immunities 
Clause—not merely its ghost—can give proper support to the Republican 
arguments against the constitutionality of school segregation.  Given the 
 
 238. Michael W. McConnell, Segregation and the Original Understanding: A Reply to 
Professor Maltz, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 233, 240 (1996). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
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number of scholars advocating the reversal of Slaughterhouse, however, this 
seems by no means a fatal problem. 
E. Rubenfeld on Brown 
In arguing for Brown, Rubenfeld claims in chapter ten of Freedom and 
Time that he can show why it is “an easy case” under his method.241  Tellingly, 
Rubenfeld nowhere in this chapter quotes or reasons from the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but begins with the foundational forbidden paradigm 
case, the black codes.242  This paradigm case was recognized in 
Slaughterhouse,243 then expanded in Strauder.244  Rubenfeld applauds 
Strauder’s formulation quoted at greater length above—“legal discriminations, 
implying inferiority in civil society”245—as the proper result of later 
interpreters’ inventing categories to cover the paradigm case.  He then 
applauds Brown v. Board of Education’s argument that segregation is 
unconstitutional because it “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status 
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way likely ever to 
be undone,” which Rubenfeld takes to be a proper expansion of Strauder’s 
“inferiority in civil society.”246  Judges need only “formulate something like an 
anti-inferiorization or anti-caste principle for the equal protection clause” and 
then find that principle violated because “racial separation laws were 
untouchability laws.”247 
I agree that an anti-inferiorization or anti-caste principle is what we need in 
order to legitimize Brown, but I disagree sharply with Rubenfeld about where 
we should get it.  I think, in line with Sumner’s argument above, that we 
should derive such a principle from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
originally understood.  We cannot merely “formulate” one out of our own 
materials.  Rubenfeld mentions his desire to “do justice to the text in light of its 
paradigm cases,”248 but he does not mention the actual text at all.  His method 
seems better described as “doing justice, in addition to the paradigm cases.”  
The actual text of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the textual concept of 
privileges and immunities of citizens, do not do any actual work for Rubenfeld.  
We start with the paradigm cases and then add some principles that seem right.  
He concedes that “the interpretive task called for by the paradigm case 
method—the task of extrapolating principles from paradigm cases and 
 
 241. RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 22, at 180. 
 242. Id. at 182. 
 243. Id. at 191. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307–08 (1879)). 
 246. RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 21, at 192. 
 247. Id. at 193. 
 248. Id. at 194; see also id. at 190 (“Paradigm case interpretation is the effort to do justice to a 
text in light of its paradigm cases.”). 
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applying those principles to new facts—irreducibly requires the exercise of 
judicial, normative, evaluative judgment.”249  The idea seems to be that we, as 
interpreters, have our own norms and values, and we use them to produce the 
principles.  Our interpretations are only as good as our own character on which 
we draw to produce those principles.  But if that is right, what is the normative 
external constraint on interpretation?  A normative support for Brown should 
explain why it is right, and why the intermediate principles it uses are right.  If 
our interpretive method has, itself, an irreducibly normative element, merely in 
virtue of the fact that we are interpreting a constitution, then we risk a sort of 
circular reasoning in explaining why Brown is a good decision.  The reasoning 
would seem to go like this: (a) Brown is a good idea, because (b) Brown is the 
best interpretation of the Constitution, because (c) Brown is a good idea.  The 
Theory of Original Sinn, though, can supply a reason why intermediate 
principles are right, using the sense of the text as originally understood and 
arguments such as Sumner’s that use that text.  But Rubenfeld, insisting on the 
freedom of later interpreters, cannot.  He properly relies on intermediate 
principles like the anti-caste principle as enunciated in Strauder v. West 
Virginia and Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, but disavows any reliance on 
textual justification for those principles. 
Consider one simple example of an alternative principle that could cover 
paradigm cases just as well.  We can cover 1868’s paradigm cases of the 
Fourteenth Amendment just as well if we limit our principles to situations that 
exist before, say, 1940.  That is, we might say that the Fourteenth Amendment 
has a sunset provision at some point in the future.  We might reason that 
constitutional provisions really ought to be able to get into the hearts and 
minds of legislators within seventy years or so, and that if a constitutional 
provision is still being violated after all that time, there’s no point in striking 
legislation down.  Such a principle will do just as well in capturing the 
original, motivating paradigm cases, so such a principle cannot be wrong 
because it fails to cover the paradigm cases.  The motivating paradigm cases, 
of course, all existed in 1868.  Textualism gives a simple reason why a sunset 
principle is wrong: there just isn’t a sunset provision in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  If the text does not have a sunset provision, our principles cannot 
include one.  But on Rubenfeld’s approach, I cannot see what would keep such 
principles out, if not the text.  And the anathemas that Rubenfeld pronounces 
against any form of textualism prevent him from utilizing this method himself. 
Rubenfeld can argue, of course, that a sunset provision is, substantively, a 
bad idea.  Those doing paradigm-case reasoning should only use good 
principles that can also cover the paradigm case.  But surely whether a 
constitutional provision has a sunset provision should not turn on whether 
present interpreters think such a provision would be a good idea.  There must 
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therefore be more to justify an intermediate constitutional principle than (a) 
intrinsic desirability, and (b) ability to cover the paradigm cases.  The text has 
always been the standard source for such justification in constitutional 
interpretation, and Rubenfeld gives no good explanation why we should either 
turn to some different source or do without one entirely. 
Rubenfeld lacks what the Theory of Original Sinn supplies: a reason why 
we should pick one set of intermediate principles over another.  The Theory of 
Original Sinn requires that we should pick those intermediate principles that 
either (a) correctly restate the original constitutional sense, or (b) correctly 
combine the original constitutional sense with the actual facts about the world.  
We should prefer an anti-caste principle to the extent that it follows from the 
sense of the Fourteenth Amendment: for instance, if it can truly be said that a 
law enforcing caste would “abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States.”  In order to make that determination, we must attach 
particular meanings to such words as “abridge” and “privileges or 
immunities”—we cannot merely jump from the paradigm cases to an 
intermediate principle that seems good to us.  Rubenfeld, though, does not 
want to consider how the constitutional language was understood, but only 
wants to consider the paradigm cases.  Just as we require of the Framers that 
they give a textual reason why they support the intermediate constitutional 
principles and ultimate constitutional conclusions so that we can evaluate those 
reasons, we must ourselves have a better reason for our own intermediate 
principles and conclusions than their intrinsic attractiveness to us.  Rubenfeld 
simply asserts his preference for the principles that he likes, and which would 
support Brown.  But the Theory of Original Sinn offers the materials for a 
reason why those principles are good ones as an interpretive matter.  Because 
the Theory of Original Sinn avoids resting constitutional interpretation on the 
mere ipse dixit of later interpreters, it is a better candidate for offering an actual 
normative defense of Brown, rather than a pledge of adherence to it. 
As I noted above, the rules of Strauder and Harlan’s Plessy dissent use the 
language and argumentation pertaining to equality of the privileges of 
citizenship in a way that lacks good textual warrant if Slaughterhouse remains 
governing law.  Overturning Slaughterhouse in the name of the original sense 
of the Fourteenth Amendment therefore allows these arguments to have a 
much sounder normative basis in the constitutional text. 
Rubenfeld argues that the paradigm-case method makes better sense of the 
post-Brown desegregation cases than can a theory that says that the Framers 
were wrong because they did not know that education would become a civil 
right.250  But we can disagree with earlier interpreters, not merely on whether 
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education was a civil right, but on whether the segregationary stamp of 
inferiority abridges the rights characteristically enjoyed by citizens.  Sumner’s 
arguments regarding common carriers are easily adequate to explain buses, 
golf courses, public beaches, and bathhouses.  Miscegenation is a larger topic, 
but can be handled along the same lines: as McConnell points out, none of the 
Republican supporters of desegregation denied that their constitutional theory 
would invalidate miscegenation laws as well.251 
F. Fallon on Brown 
Fallon argues that the failure of originalist arguments to support Brown 
should give support to Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution, 
which has an affinity with Fallon’s fifth mode of constitutional 
interpretation.252  Fallon relies on much the same evidence that Raoul Berger 
does, writing that “those who wrote and ratified the relevant provisions 
apparently did not understand them to forbid school segregation.”253  This 
statement may be true, but as discussed above, it is not dispositive under the 
Theory of Original Sinn: lack of an understanding of a particular referent does 
not entail the lack of a grasp of a sense which, when combined with the actual 
facts, produces that referent.  Note as well that not understanding a provision to 
forbid segregation is distinct from understanding the provision not to forbid 
segregation.  Charles Black stresses this point: “In [Bickel’s] data I find, to be 
sure, a case for concluding that the relevant people did not ‘intend’ to abolish 
 
on the heels of Brown in which the Court tore down America’s racial separation regime in all its 
de jure forms, from segregated golf courses to public beaches.”) (footnotes omitted).  Rubenfeld 
cites Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (dealing with buses), Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 
U.S. 879 (1955) (dealing with golf courses), Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) 
(dealing with public beaches and bathhouses), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (dealing 
with interracial marriage).  RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 21, at 192–93 n.21. 
 251. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1018 (“[I]t is striking that not a single supporter of the 
1875 Act attempted to deny that under their interpretation, anti-miscegenation laws were 
unconstitutional.”). 
 252. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 253. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 1.  Fallon’s evidence for 
this assertion is much the same as that evidence adduced by Berger: 
  This is certainly the consensus view among legal historians, who note, among other 
things, that when the Equal Protection Clause was ratified in 1868, five northern states 
excluded black children completely from public education, while an additional eight states 
permitted segregated schools.  There was little or no evidence in the surrounding 
legislative history that either Congress in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, or the 
states in ratifying it, meant to force a change in this practice.  On the contrary, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended largely to constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act, and the principal sponsors of that Act specifically denied that it would force the 
integration of public education.  Indeed, the Reconstruction Congress that proposed the 
Fourteenth Amendment maintained segregation in the District of Columbia schools. 
Id. at 139 n.7 (citations omitted). 
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segregation, in the sense that they had no positive and consciously formed 
intention of doing so.  That conclusion means little when one is dealing with 
general language.”254  Black distinguishes what he thought was not shown: 
“[A] definitely formed intent to exclude segregation from the prohibitive ambit 
of the amendment’s general words—a totally different meaning of the 
predicate ‘did not intend.’”255 
Fallon moves, however, from this more limited claim to a much more 
expansive dismissal of originalism on the basis of Brown.  Fallon restates his 
position, “The Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment apparently 
had no specific intent to abolish school segregation, which flourished as much 
after the ratification of the [Fourteenth Amendment] as it had before.”256  From 
this lack of a specific intent, however—that is, the lack of an original 
understanding of the reference of the Fourteenth Amendment’s expressions to 
include desegregation—Fallon moves immediately to dismiss, on the basis of 
Brown, any binding force for the original understanding, even the original 
understanding of the sense of the constitutional language.  Fallon writes: 
  If viewed as a “paradigm” of appropriate Supreme Court decision making, 
Brown v. Board of Education teaches [that] . . . . under widely accepted norms 
of interpretive practice, the Supreme Court simply is not bound in every case 
by a narrow conception of the framers’ intent or the original understanding of 
constitutional language.  Original understandings provide an important 
reference point for the assessment of constitutional meaning, but need not 
always prove decisive.  Within limits, the Court is entitled to provide what 
Professor Dworkin calls a “moral reading” of the Constitution.257 
Fallon overlooks the possibility that I embrace: that the “original 
understanding of constitutional language”—that is, the original understanding 
of the sense of constitutional language—might be binding even where the 
“narrow conception of the Framers’ intent”—that is, the original beliefs about 
the referent of constitutional language—is not.  He moves too quickly to 
embrace moral theorizing as the only means whereby we might correct the 
Framers, neglecting the possibility that we might disagree with the Framers, 
not on moral questions, but simply on the reference-yielding facts.  Indeed, we 
need not even disagree with the Framers on the reference-yielding facts, but 
 
 254. Black, supra note 208, at 423 n.14. 
 255. Id. 
 256. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 57.  Parenthetically, as 
McConnell documents, there was a significant movement for desegregation in the North after the 
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 257. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 58 (footnote omitted). 
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might simply know more than they do; their ignorance of a constitutional 
referent is obviously not dispositive, whether we take a moral reading or not. 
The Theory of Original Sinn does not deny that, if the Constitution 
contains moral terminology, then moral theorizing would be needed in order to 
figure out the Constitutional referent.  For instance, the Fifth Amendment 
refers to “just compensation.”258  Without a theory of the remedial justice 
pertaining to compensation, we cannot interpret this expression: if “just” 
expresses a moral evaluation, then finding out the facts about “just 
compensation” will require determining the substance of moral reality.  
Sometimes, it does seem that the Constitution allows moral reality to shape its 
tangible results.  To know the referent of an expression using terms like 
“population,” interpreters must learn the facts about population.  Likewise, to 
know the proper referent of an expression including moral terms like “just,” 
later interpreters have no choice but to assess the moral facts about justice. 
However, I see little compelling grounds to think that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s language expresses moral concepts.  “The privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States” seems to refer to legal rights, not 
moral ones: to discover them, we are to conduct a legal and sociological study 
of the privileges and immunities that have characterized citizenship in the 
United States, not a moral study of the rights that people ought to have.  There 
seems little warrant for thinking, as Fallon and Dworkin would, that they have 
particularly moral content.  Consider the Republican view of the clause in 
1872.  The moral reading is not evident. Senator Sumner, while he cited the 
Declaration of Independence and a large variety of other documents in order to 
argue for the proposition that citizens should have equal rights and in arguing 
that his bill was a good idea, his exposition of the substance of the rights of 
citizens looks to a careful examination of the common law and the rights that 
generally characterize citizenship, not moral philosophy.  He wanted equality 
in privileges “created or regulated by law.”  Senator Sherman, quoted above, is 
most explicit in claiming that knowing the privileges of citizens requires a 
careful examination of the common law and other customary rights of citizens. 
There is no theoretical per se bar to a moral reading of a morally expressed 
provision.  A constitution-writer could easily say, “No State shall make or 
enforce unjust laws,” and to find out the reference of the expression “unjust 
laws,” we would need to know the facts about justice.259  But the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s language does not seem to be moral language. 
That said, our moral outrage at racial segregation is not interpretively 
irrelevant: we are from the same political tradition that produced Charles 
Sumner, and his outrage and ours may well have a common root and find 
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judicially enforceable.  But it is imaginable. 
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common expression in the Fourteenth Amendment.  Given our moral opinions 
about segregation, to the extent that they are the moral opinions likely to be 
held by sensible people and to follow from sensible principles, and to the 
extent that the Framers, too, were sensible people and enacted sensible 
principles, we have some reason to think that the Framers would have enacted 
a principle from which our conclusions about segregation follow. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The Theory of Original Sinn puts an emphasis on the text of the 
Constitution as historically understood that is in line with the Supreme Court’s 
historical approach and with the intuitive idea that office-holders swear to obey 
historically embedded constitutional language (“this Constitution”) as the 
supreme law of the land.  The theory that the original sense, but not the 
original reference, is interpretively binding makes better sense of the possible 
phenomena of Framer ignorance and error than do other theories that either 
privilege reference, like Berger’s or Rubenfeld’s theories, or that impose 
excessively complicated and rigid rules, like Fallon’s theory.  It offers a more 
successful way to give normative support to the desegregation decision in 
Brown than can these other theories. 
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